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Abstract 
 
This paper rigorously investigates the determinants of bank competition for 146 countries over 
the sample period 1999-2011. The results employing both the Lerner index and the Boone 
indicator, reveal the distinctive characteristics of the competition drivers across different income 
groups of countries. Amongst other things, a concentrated banking system jeopardises 
competitiveness in developing economies, however, such a causal nexus is absent for advanced 
and emerging economies. Contestability and institutional development seem to boost 
competition in less-developed banking systems, whereas inter-industry competition and financial 
freedom are beneficial to advanced banking systems. These findings survive robustness tests.     
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1      Introduction 
The essential role of bank credit as an input in the production of goods and services places banks 
in a unique and influential position, such that any inefficiency in credit allocation, or other 
market distortions in banking, are almost certain to be felt throughout the economy (Shaffer 
2004).  Hence, the issue of bank competition is of vital importance, and the study of market 
competition can help understand the social welfare implications of changes in the banking sector. 
As in other industries, the degree of competition in the financial sector matters for the efficiency 
of production of financial services, the quality of financial products and the degree of innovation 
in the sector (Claessens 2009). Therefore, the banking sector can impose severe costs on an 
economy, if there is anticompetitive behaviour, leading to inefficiency or market failure among 
banks. This vindicates the importance of more research into this issue, where the degree of 
banking competition and its association with banking structure, regulations, institutions and other 
key characteristics of a country is essential for welfare-related public policy in the banking 
industry.  Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2007) point out that, from the regulator’s point of 
view, knowledge and understanding of the degree of competition may be limited, but finding the 
main sources of market power complements this limitation in order to carry out the reforms 
necessary to achieve a reduction of the social costs associated with the existence of monopoly 
power. Numerous studies have focused on analysing the evolution of competition in banking 
markets, however, studies that have attempted to investigate factors explaining intensity of 
competition are rather limited.  See e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) and Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2007) who conducted research for advanced 
economies.  In terms of emerging and developing economies, there is very little empirical work 
found, except for those of Jeon et al (2011) and Delis (2012).2   
 It is argued that banking sectors in emerging and developing markets are characterised by 
higher market-power, relatively weak legal systems, and high levels of networking and 
corruption in their respective financial systems, which might constrain the strength of 
competitive forces compared with those in developed banking systems. Following financial 
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 Jeon et al. (2011) investigated emerging Asian and Latin American markets, however, their focus was on the effect 
of foreign banks, omitting such variables as those relating to institutions, inter-industry and contestability.  Delis 
(2012) studied bank competition for 84 countries with a view to analysing the impact of financial reform.    
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market deregulation in the late 1980s in many emerging countries, their banking markets have 
been subjected to several structural changes: The prominent features include innovation in 
financial products and services, removing barriers to entry, hosting foreign banks, developments 
in information technology, liberalisation of the financial sector and the internationalisation of 
banking activities.  However, the market-power of financial intermediation in emerging and 
developing economies remained higher than that in most advanced economies. Abiad et al. 
(2010) show countries in all income groups and regions, which have significantly reformed their 
financial sectors over the period 1973-2005. Out of 136 large-reform events, 39 were for 
emerging, 25 for advanced, and the rest for developing economies. The main objective of 
financial reform policies was to promote a diversified, efficient and competitive financial system 
which is essential for an efficient allocation of capital. Delis (2012) has attempted to investigate 
whether such reforms have been effective in promoting competition among banks, by analysing 
the impact of financial reform and the quality of institutions on the degree of bank market-power 
for 84 banking systems around the world. Estimating the bank-level Bonne indicator for the 
market-power of banks, Delis (2012) finds that bureaucratic quality, the rule of law and 
transparency, negatively affect market-power but financial liberalization policies improve 
competition among banks, only if the country meets certain criteria of institutional endowment. 
Hence, financial reform may not have translated into the improvement of banking competition in 
countries with weaker institutions and a lower level of institutional development. Such concerns 
may be smaller in advanced countries, which have developed financial, legal and regulatory 
systems, as well as strong protections for private property and economic freedom. These issues 
seem to necessitate the study by distinguishing emerging and developing from advanced 
economies in order to trace the differences in findings in the theoretical arguments available in 
the literature.   
In this paper, we rigorously investigate the driving forces of competition-behaviour in the 
banking sector by distinguishing between developed, emerging and developing economies. Due 
to data availability, it is impossible to cover all countries, however, we have a very large 
coverage of 146 countries over the recent sample period of 1999-2011, which encompasses the 
period of the financial crisis triggered by the US subprime-market. We relate the evolution of 
competition to bank structures, contestability, inter-industry, institutional and other potential 
explanatory variables (Claessens and Laeven 2004, Jeon et al. 2011 and Delis 2012), and 
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systematically compare across these three types of economies to avoid proposing a general 
pattern for all countries.   
As one of the driving forces in the evolution of competition, firstly, we consider 
concentration. Theory provides predictions about the link between market-structure and bank-
competition. According to the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis, a more 
concentrated market implies a lower degree of competition due to the undesirable exercise of 
market power by banks. It can be also argued that regulatory impediments to competition also 
create a desirable environment for a few powerful banks to hinder competition. According to this 
view, a concentrated market is a useful signal of an uncompetitive market. Indeed, antitrust 
authorities use measures of market-concentration to make an initial assessment of competition, 
and analyse whether concentration will create or enhance the exercise of market-power. The 
issues of competition and concentration in the banking industry are heavily debated by policy 
makers, however, the empirical literature on the relationship is comparatively scarce. Also, 
existing studies have shown a mixed picture. Whilst earlier studies find an inverse relationship 
between concentration and the degree of competition, new empirical studies show a lesser 
association of concentration and competition
3
, and hence they cannot be used interchangeably.  
For example, if the market is contestable, i.e. no barriers to entry and exit, even very 
concentrated markets can remain competitive.  The lack of importance of market structure 
implies that competition policy in the financial sector is more complicated than it is expected.  
Thus, more work needs to be done to shed further light on this debate.  
Secondly, the role of market regulations is considered as a determinant in shaping 
competition. According to the theory of industrial organization, the competitiveness of an 
industry cannot be measured by market-structure alone, whereas the theory of entry can be a 
more relevant issue for analysing factors that explain the behaviour of market participants. Also, 
the New Industrial Organization theory proposes a structural, contestability approach that can 
                                                          
 
3
 The studies by Claessens and Laeven (2004), Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005) Fernández de Guevara and 
Maudos (2007) and Carbo et al. (2009) all show the inadequacy of using concentration measures as a proxy for the 
competition environment in the banking sector.   
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effectively test the degree of competition (see Baumol 1982).  Institutional quality, as well as the 
degree of inter-industry competition (such as stock market and insurance companies), may also 
play an important role in determining banking-system competitiveness (Claessens and Laeven 
2004). For instance, it is found that the institutional environments in some countries hampers 
competition.  Hence, we also consider these factors in our empirical analyses.  
Estimation of competition, i.e. the inverse of market-power, is heavily influenced by the 
New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) literature. This literature has been developed 
primarily from the models of, for instance, Bresnahan (1982) and Panzar and Rosse (1987). The 
most popular tool, widely used for the estimation of bank market-power, is the Lerner (1934) 
index, owing to its simplicity, its straightforward interpretation and the fact that it does not pose 
stringent data requirements. The H-statistic of Panzar and Rosse (1987) is also used routinely in 
the literature on banking to assess degrees of competition. The disadvantage of this method is 
that it maps the various degrees of market-power only weakly and, thus, cannot be viewed as a 
continuous variable. Bikker et al (2009) argue that the only hypothesis that can be tested using 
the H-statistic is whether a bank operates in long run equilibrium.    
In our empirical application, we employ the Lerner index and also the Boone indicator. 
The Lerner index is the price-cost margin and is the method often used in several studies of 
banking competition (e.g. Fernandez de Guevara et al. 2005 and Anginer et al. 2013). The Boone 
indicator is the elasticity of profits to marginal cost (Boone et al. 2005 and Boone 2008). It 
captures the reallocation of market-share to efficient from inefficient banks. See Van 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) and Delis (2012) for the empirical application. The published data at 
country-level by the World Bank (Global Financial Development Database 2012) are utilised for 
the Lerner index and the Boone indicator. We also use two other databases of bank competition 
as robustness tests. The first one is the adjusted Lerner index and the Boone indicator at country-
level, reported in  Clerides et al. (2013), and the second one is based on our own estimation of 
the Lerner index at bank-level using the BankScope database. 
The empirical results reveal distinctive characteristics of competition-drivers for different 
income levels of an economy. A concentrated banking system jeopardises the competitiveness in 
developing economies, in line with the traditional view of competition policy, whereas such a 
causal nexus is absent for advanced and emerging economies. Contestability and institutional 
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development are found to be the key driving forces of competition in non-advanced banking 
systems. Rivalry from other segments of financial-services industries and financial freedom are 
contributory to boosting the competitiveness amongst advanced banks. The ownership structure 
seems to matter for bank competition in emerging and developing countries. Foreign bank-
ownership favours competition for the former, whereas state bank-ownership is a hindrance to 
competition in the latter. These findings are robust to model specification and alternative 
measures of competition and remain unchanged by controlling bank-specific traits.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews literature. Section 
3 provides the empirical models. Section 4 presents an analysis of data. Section 5 contains the 
estimation results together with robustness tests. Conclusions are offered in Section 6. 
 
2     Literature Review 
With respect to competition measures, several indicators are found in literature, which can be 
classified into two major categories: those that use the traditional structural measures of 
competition and those that fall within the so-called ‘new empirical industrial organization’ 
models (i.e. the non-structural approach). The traditional measures use concentration indices 
under the structure–conduct–performance or the efficient-structure hypothesis. The non-
structural indicators include the estimation of the mark-up test of Bresnahan (1982), the Panzar 
and Rosse test (Nathan and Neave 1989, Molyneux et al. 1994 and Bikker and Haaf 2002) or 
instruments derived from Monti–Klein-type banking competition models, such as the estimation 
of Lerner index (Fernández de Guevara et al. 2005 and Maudos and Fernández de  Guevara 
2007).   
One of the non-structural indicators used to assess competitive behaviour in financial 
services are based on the model advocated by Panzar and Rosse (1987). This methodology, 
extensively applied in banking studies, is based on reduced-form revenue functions using bank-
level data. It investigates market-power, the so-called, H-statistic, measured by the extent to 
which changes in factor prices are reflected in revenues. Panzar and Rosse show that this statistic 
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can reflect the structure and conduct of the market to which the firm belongs
4
. The critical 
feature of the H-statistic is that it measures a degree of bank-competition over a specific period 
of time, giving one score over that time so that it does not capture the evolution of bank-
competition.  Although Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Jeon et al. (2011) estimate the time-varying 
version of Panzar and Rosse H-statistics in order to account for the market dynamic of a banking 
system, it does not come without limitations. For instance, using the time-varying H-statistics 
implies that either bank competition is increasing or decreasing over-time, and this is not in 
accordance with the real world, since, if competition increases in one year, it may decease or be 
constant in the next year5.      
An alternative approach to the Panzer and Rosse methodology is the Lerner model 
developed by Lerner (1934), which has recently attracted many European scholars. This is 
developed from the (static) theory of firm models under equilibrium conditions and typically use 
some form of price mark-up against a competitive benchmark: the Lerner index is the mark-up of 
price (average revenue) over marginal cost. The higher the mark-up, the greater is the realized 
market power. In empirical work, a number of recent studies have used the Lerner index to 
determine the trend in competitive behaviour over time, specifically, in European countries.  
Boone (2000 and 2005) and Boone et al. (2005) introduced, the so-called Boone 
Indicator, which measures the impact of efficiency on performance in terms of profits or market-
share. The underlying concept behind the Boone indicator is that competition enhances the 
performance of efficient banks and impairs the performance of inefficient banks, which is 
reflected in their respective profits or market-share. This approach is closely associated with the 
well-known efficiency hypothesis, which also explains banks’ performances by differences in 
efficiency (Goldberg and Rai 1996 and Smirlock 1985). The hypothesis of Boone’s model takes 
                                                          
4
 For a body of recent literature using H-statistic to gauge the degree of bank competition,  see, e.g. Mamatzakis et 
al. (2005), Levy Yeyati and Micco (2007) and Delis (2010) for emerging economies, and Matthews et al. (2007) an 
Goddard and Wilson (2009) for advanced economies (for a comprehensive study see also Bikker et al. 2012). 
5
 Bikker et al. (2012) also show that a Panzar-Rosse price function or scaled-revenue equations which have been 
widely applied in literature cannot be used to infer the degree of competition.  They argue that only an unscaled 
revenue equation version of H-statistics may yield a valid measure of competition.  Even if the competitive climate 
is assessed on the basis of an unscaled revenue equation, the Panzar-Rosse H statistic generally requires additional 
information about costs, market equilibrium and market-demand elasticity to allow meaningful interpretation. 
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two steps.  Firstly, efficient banks, i.e. banks with lower marginal costs, gain higher market- 
share or profits. Secondly, this is translated into the fact that, if this effect is stronger, the higher 
the degree of competition in that particular market is. See, for instance, Van Leuvensteijn et al. 
(2007), who is the first to apply the Boone indicator to the banking market for the Euro area.   
Studies attempting to assess the impact of banking market-structure, regulations and 
institutional factors on competition are limited. Bikker and Haaf (2002), for instance, regress the 
H-statistic on a variety of concentration indices for a sample of 23 industrialized countries, and 
the results show the presence of a negative relationship between the degree of concentration and 
the level of competition. Contrary to these results, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), in their analysis 
of the Italian banking sector, uncover a positive association using the Lerner index and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. For a sample of 50 countries, Claessens and Laeven (2004) also 
find the same result by employing the H-statistic.  Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005) in a study 
on European banking sectors emphasise that concentration is inadequate as an indicator of 
competition. Likewise, Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006) report that European 
banking systems have experienced a substantial increase in competition (measured by the H-
Statistic) during the period 1998–2002 with higher levels of concentration. Furthermore, Park 
(2009) examined whether consolidation amongst Korean commercial banks lessened competition 
for the period 1992-2004, and found that contrary to a growing concern over market-power of 
Korean banks, an increased concentration has not impaired competition.   
According to the traditional viewpoint, an increase in concentration fosters collusion and 
impairs competition. However, it is difficult to judge whether concentration decreases 
competition among banks, based on these empirical findings, where the case for using 
concentration as a proxy for competition is seriously disputed. This is critical for the inference of 
policy implications since concentration does not necessarily imply a lack of competition.  
Claessens and Laeven (2004) analyse the effect of banking regulations and institutional 
settings’ indicators on competitiveness employing the constant H-statistics of Panzar and Rosse 
(1987). Using bank-level data for 50 countries, they find that the contestability market-theory 
showed a stronger effect on competition than did concentration, in particular, fewer entry and 
activity restrictions as well as greater foreign-bank entry to the market positively affected the 
level of competition. The finding of Bikker and Spierdijk (2009) based on the Panzar-Rosse 
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approach is supportive to that of Claessens and Laeven (2004) for 101 countries: traditional 
market-structure variables, such as concentration and the number of banks are found to have no 
impact at all. In Bikker and Spierdijk (2009), explaining the measured competition by a large set 
of potential determinants reveal that competition in many countries would be higher with more 
anti-trust regulation, fewer obstacles to foreign investment and fewer cross-sector restrictions.  
Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) also find that the deregulation process significantly contributed to 
improving bank-competition during the 1990s in Italy, whereas Turk-Ariss (2009) argues that 
contestability determines effective competition by allowing foreign-bank entry and reducing 
activity restrictions on banks in the Middle Eastern and North African banking sectors. The study 
by Beck et al (2013) indicates that the positive association between competition and banks' 
fragility increases with the presence of strict activity restrictions. Delis (2012) examines the 
degree of market-power as measured by the Boone indicator for 84 banking systems worldwide, 
and finds that competition improves in developed countries with advanced institutions, however, 
it is unlikely to improve at the same rate in countries with weaker institutions. The empirical 
evidence by Anginer et al (2013) also reveals that a lack of competition can be mitigated by a 
strong institutional environment.  
The structure of the banking sector provides information on potential threats to 
competition.  However, a growing body of empirical research over the past decade or two seems 
to suggest that structure, itself, does not seem to impair competition. It is the conduct of financial 
institutions that may determine competitive behaviour among banks. To assess the real situation 
of banking systems in terms of competition, we investigate the evolution of competition by 
relating it to market structure, contestability, inter-industry competition and institutional and 
macro-economic conditions. We include all developed, emerging and developing countries, as 
long as data availability permits, and systematically compare these three types of economies to 
derive the specific sources of competition. The more sophisticated measures of the Lerner index 
and the Boone indicator are utilised for competition rather than the Panzer-Rosse method. 
Determining the drivers of competition and observing different features across different income 
groups are crucial in further developing competitive policies and regulations.   
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3     Model specification 
3.1      Measuring competition  
The Lerner index is a measure of market-power in the banking market. It is defined as the 
difference between output prices and marginal costs (relative to prices). Prices are calculated as 
total bank revenue over assets, whereas marginal costs are obtained from an estimated translog 
cost function with respect to output. The index ranges from the highest, 1, to the lowest, 0, with a 
higher number implying greater market-power or less competition. The dataset of the Lerner 
index of the World Bank follows the methodology described in Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez 
Pería (2010) using data collected from Bankscope. The Boone indicator is a measure of the 
degree of competition, computed as the elasticity of profits to marginal costs. To obtain the 
elasticity, the log of profits (measured by return on assets) is regressed on the log of marginal 
costs. The estimated coefficient (derived from the first derivative of a translog cost function) is 
the elasticity. The rationale behind the indicator is that higher profits are achieved by more 
efficient banks. Hence, the more negative the Boone indicator, the higher the degree of 
competition is, since the effect of reallocation is stronger. The dataset of the Boone indicator in 
the World Bank follow the methodology used by Schaeck and Čihák (2010) with some 
modification by using marginal costs instead of average costs. Regional estimates of the Boone 
indicator pool the bank data by regions (for more information, see Hay and Liu 1997, Boone 
2001 and Boone et al. 2005), based on underlying data in Bankscope. For our main empirical 
application, the dataset of the World Bank is used.   
For the robustness test, we employ the dataset of the adjusted Lerner index and the Boone 
indicator published in Clarides et al. (2013). The bank selection criteria for estimating the Lerner 
and Boone indicators are different from the dataset of the World Bank. There are also a number 
of differences in estimation. Firstly, Clarides et al. use the modification of the conventional 
Lerner index, i.e. adjusted Lerner index that accounts for the possibility of foregone rents 
(Koetter et al. 2012). Koetter et al (2012) pointed out that the conventional Lerner index assumes 
both profit- and cost-efficiency, hence the estimated price-cost margins do not accurately 
measure the true picture of market-power. See Koetter et al. (2012) who developed the 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner index. Secondly, marginal costs are estimated based on a smooth 
coefficient model, or a semi-parametric method, of Delis (2012), which allows increasing the 
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flexibility of the functional form imposed on the cost function. Clarides et al. use the local 
polynomial fitting regression and the Gaussian kernel function to obtain regression coefficients 
of the translog costs function for each bank at each time period. See Delis et al. (2012) for the 
detailed discussion. Delis et al.(2012) and Wheelock and Wilson (2012) show that estimation of 
marginal costs using semi-parametric and non-parametric methods performs significantly better 
than do parametric techniques.   
The two datasets of the World Bank and Clarides et al (2013) are at country-level.  
Hence, we elaborate by estimating the bank-level data of the Lerner index for a further 
robustness check covering 134 countries (see Panel C, Table A1 in Appendix). This allows us to 
assess the impact of bank regulations and institutions at bank-level
6
. The Lerner index is 
computed as:  
         
        
   
                                                                 
where     is the price charged by bank   at time   on their assets and     is the marginal cost.  
The marginal cost is estimated on the basis of the following translog cost function for each 
country: 
                    
 
 
           
              
 
 
 
   
      
 
   
 
   
               
                
 
   
                
                                                                                      
where     is the total cost (interest expenses and other operating costs) of bank   at time   . 
Following prior studies (e.g. Anginer et al. 2013, among others), we choose one output: total 
assets ( ), and three input prices: cost of deposits (  ) computed by dividing financial costs 
(interest paid) by their corresponding liabilities, cost of labour (  ) calculated by dividing 
personnel costs by total assets, and cost of physical capital (  ) calculated as the ratio between 
expenditures on plant and equipment (other non-interest expenses) and the book value of 
                                                          
6
 Note that the Boone indicator cannot be estimated at bank-level.     
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physical capital (fixed assets). Since we have three bank specializations of commercial, co-
operative and savings banks, we use bank dummies to capture the effect of each type of bank 
(Anginer et al. 2013). Furthermore, to account for changes in technology over time, we include 
Year dummies.  
 With the symmetry restriction imposed, necessary and sufficient conditions for our 
translog specification are linearly homogeneous in input prices, hence:  
   
 
   
       
 
   
                
 
   
     
We then use the coefficient estimates from Eq.(2) to estimate the marginal cost for bank   in 
time  : 
     
    
    
 
   
   
                                      
 
   
 
3.2     Determinants of competition  
We consider the banking market-structure, contestability, inter-industry, institutions and 
macroeconomic environment for the determinants of competition.   
For the structure of the banking system, we specify the following variables: i) bank 
concentration, which is measured by the market share of the five largest banks in the country, ii) 
a number of banks per hundred thousand inhabitants in a particular country as a proxy for the 
density of banks, and iii) foreign and state bank ownership, i.e. the share of assets of banks 
which are foreign-controlled and government-controlled
7
, respectively. Note that those banks 
that are 50% or more government- and foreign-owned are taken account of as state- and foreign-
owned, respectively.   
For contestability of the respective markets, we consider i) the activity restriction 
variable, which indicates the limits imposed on commercial banks to engage in securities 
markets, insurance and real estate activities with higher scores indicating more restrictions (Barth 
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 Government ownership of banks is likely to influence the pricing of loans and deposits. 
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et al. 2001), ii) the limit on foreign banks, which measures the extent to which foreign banks may 
own domestic banks and enter a country's banking industry, iii) the entry requirement and the 
fraction of entry applications denied to both domestic and foreign banks, and iv) the restriction 
on the formulation of financial conglomerates
8
. With institutional variables, we employ i) an 
overall indicator of financial freedom that captures the degree to which banks are free to conduct 
their business, ii) property rights that are an indicator of the protection of private property rights, 
and iii) the KKZ institution index that is an aggregate indicator of the quality of institutional 
development in the country, computed using information on six issues of voice accountability, 
political stability, a government’s effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption. For inter-industry development, we specify i) the degree of insurance penetration that 
is measured by the amount of annual life and non-life insurance premiums collected, divided by 
GDP, as a competition indicator from non-bank financial institutions, and ii) market 
capitalization and stock-market efficiency measured by the stock-market turnover ratio as a 
proxy of the degree of capital-market competition. For these institutional variables, a positive 
association with competition is expected. Likewise a positive relationship is expected for inter-
industry indicators, where the developed non-bank financial institutions or capital markets 
generate competitive pressure on the banking system. 
For control variables, we specify macroeconomic variables of GDP per capita as a proxy 
for the general level of development in a country, bank-credit growth, GDP growth as a proxy 
for the economic size and activity, and the inflation rate as an indicator for macroeconomic 
stability.     
By specifying the above potential determinants of competition, we have the following 
model for estimation (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2004 and Claessens and Laeven 2004): 
                                                                 
                                                        
                                                                  
where subscripts    and   refer to country and year, respectively.             is a 
competitiveness indicator: the Lerner index or the Boone indicator. Market structure is a vector 
of market structure indicators (concentration ratio, number of banks relative to population and 
                                                          
8
 See Table A3 in Appendix for the definition.  
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bank ownership status), Contestability is a vector of regulatory variables (activity restriction, 
financial conglomerates, limit on foreign banks, entry requirements and fraction of entry denied), 
Inter-Industry is a vector of inter-industry development indicators (insurance penetration, market 
capitalisation and stock-market efficiency) and Institution is a vector of institutional variables 
(financial freedom, property rights, and the KKZ index). Control is a vector of macroeconomic 
variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth, credit and inflation). Dummy Crisis takes 1 for year 
2008-2011, and 0 otherwise, in order to control the recent financial crisis.   is the error term.  
 
4     Data  
Three different datasets of competition are used for the main and the robustness estimations. The 
first dataset of the Lerner index and the Boone indicator used for the main estimation is, 
collected from the Global Financial Development Database of the World Bank. The database 
covers 167 countries, however, due to limited observations for some countries, we have selected 
146 countries for estimation over the period 1999-2011. The second dataset used for the 
robustness test is retrieved from Clerides et al. (2013), who provide the data of the Lerner index, 
The adjusted Lerner index and the Boone indicator. Clerides et al. estimated the degree of 
competition in the banking sectors of 148 countries worldwide over the period 1997-2010. We 
exclude those countries that are not included in our main estimation for consistency, and hence 
we have a panel dataset of 128 countries. We extract the data for the adjusted Lerner index and 
the Boone indicator from Tables 6 and 7 in Clerides et al. (2013), respectively
9
. The third dataset 
is based on bank-level data, which we have estimated by specifying the Lerner model as in Eq. 
(1) to (3) in Section 3 above. We initially selected 152 countries that have more than 5 banks in 
BankScope, however, by eliminating those countries that are not included in the main dataset, we 
have 134 countries covering 7517 banks over the period of 1999-2011
10
. 
                                                          
9
 Note that in preliminary estimation, we find similar results between the conventional Lerner index and the adjusted 
Lerner index in Clerides et al. (2013) with the correlation coefficient of 86%. 
10
 Several criteria are used to filter bank-data. Banks must be active; hence banks that went into bankruptcy are 
removed. These data are only from commercial, savings and cooperative banks: banks that carry out traditional 
banking activity. Certain outlier rules are also applied: the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles of the distributions of main 
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 Table A1 in Appendix shows the sample selection and the number of countries for these 
datasets, and Table A2 in the Appendix reproduces the Lerner index and the Boone indicator, 
published by the World Bank and Clerides et al (2013). In Table A2, the income group for each 
country is indicated by the World Bank classification.     
[Figure 1a, 1b and 2 around here]   
 Figure 1a and 1b plot the Lerner index and the Boone indicators of the World Bank and 
Clarides et al. (2013), respectively
11
. Figure 1a shows a relatively moderate and smooth 
movement, whereas significant volatility is apparent in Figure 1b. Some common trends are 
shown:  The Boone indicator seems to play a leading role in terms of evolution, as the Lerner 
index, in general, follows with approximately a one year time lag. An upward trend is observed 
up until around 2002 to 2004, indicating a gradual deterioration in competition, followed by a 
downward trend. There is a clear indication of the adverse effect of the financial crisis around 
2008, where banks started regaining their market-power.   
 Figure 2 presents the evolution of the averaged Lerner index of 146 countries in different 
income-group countries. It clearly shows a higher level of competition for advanced economies 
in comparison to less-developed countries. It is also observed that market-power in emerging 
banking systems is steadily increasing over the period, whereas the evolution of competition in 
developing countries is more or less constant over the sample period. It seems that the impact of 
the financial crisis is strongly felt in the advanced countries. This heterogeneous evolution of 
competition surely justifies our approach in classifying the countries into three different income 
groups.       
                                                                                                                                                                                           
variables are eliminated. This helps alleviate the problems arising from extreme outliers that affect estimation. In 
order to ensure that each bank is included only once in the dataset, we use unconsolidated statements when available 
and consolidated statements when the unconsolidated ones were not available. Merged banks are considered as 
separate entities before the merger and as one entity afterwards. Note also that we exclude subsidiaries of parent 
banks to avoid double counting. 
11
 Note that the correlation coefficient between the Lerner index in World Bank and the adjusted Lerner index in 
Clerides et al. (2013) is 54%, that is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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The model is specified with the contemporaneous regressors except for regulatory 
variables. With respect to contestability variables, data are based on surveys by Barth et al. 
(2013). Surveys were conducted in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011. Since the effect of the country-
level regulations is felt slowly over time and also following Anginer et al. (2014), we specify the 
previously available survey data until a new survey becomes available. Specifically, the survey 
data of 1999 are used for 1999-2002, the survey data of 2003 for 2003-2006, the survey data of 
2007 for 2007-2010, the survey data of2011 for 2011.   
[Table 1 about here] 
The detail of the definition and sources of all variables are provided in Table A3 in the 
Appendix and the average of market-structure, regulation and institutions across countries are 
shown in Table A4 in Appendix. The summary statistics are found in Table 1.   
 
5     Empirical results 
We estimate Eq. (4) by regressing the measures of competition on the potential determinants, 
applying the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) of Arellano and Bond (1991) to all 
estimations. There are likely to be correlations amongst some of the regressors specified in the 
model. For instance, as argued in González (2009), bank concentration may be associated with 
stricter bank-entry restrictions, more generous insurance, and a stronger legal environment. The 
model may also suffer from a potential endogeneity problem, among others, the effect on bank 
concentration may derive from bank competition. The GMM technique mitigates these problems. 
We use the lagged once- and twice-dependent and independent variables as instrument variables, 
which are not rejected by the Sargan test.   
5.1     Preliminary results based on World Bank dataset 
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports the preliminary regression results including all countries.
12
 We run various 
regressions by isolating one category of explanatory variables from others.
13
  This is important, 
                                                          
12
 In all estimated regressions, we included the constant term and dummy variables, though not reported. 
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since there is some concern of the potential multicollinearity amongst some independent 
variables, and also there are some missing variables in this unbalanced panel data set.
14
  Panel A 
specifies the banking structure, and Panel B deals with contestability and structure-contestability.  
Panel C and Panel D cover inter-industry and institutional indicators, respectively.   
 The result in Panel A of Table 2 evidently indicates that variables describing the banking-
system structure can help explain its measured competitiveness, in particular, bank-concentration 
 
is positively correlated with market-power. This is in line with the traditional Structure conduct-
Performance hypothesis, where intensified market-power may be brought about among the large 
dominant banks. In terms of foreign bank-ownership, the coefficient is statistically significant 
with a negative sign in all regressions, indicating that foreign bank-ownership contributes to 
improving the level of competition. Countries may benefit more from hosting foreign banks.  On 
the other hand, state bank-ownership tends to erode competition as evidenced in the Boone 
indicator, highlighting the difficulty in generating competition for the banks under state-
ownership.  Of the contestability variables in Panel B, we find that banking competition can be 
undermined by restrictions on bank activities and on the establishment of conglomerates.  
Contestable systems due to high entry-requirements also face a lesser competition. The result 
with respect to the inter-industry competition in Panel C shows that deeper insurance penetration 
enhances competition among banks, however, the competitiveness does not seem to be much 
affected by the stock-market capitalisation, nor by stock-market efficiency.     
It is argued that institutional quality is usually seen as the means by which competition in 
markets is maintained, rather than to improve competition, hence institutional variables have 
little direct effect on bank competition (Deli 2012). Notwithstanding this, turning to Panel C, the 
KKZ index and Property rights (only in the Boone indicator) are found to be exerting a positive 
effect on competition. In terms of the control variables, the results are somewhat mixed across 
regressions. The consistent results include that with the growth in bank credit, competition 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13
 However, note that we retain macroeconomic control variables in all regressions in order to control for differences 
in economic development and stability across countries.   
14
 Note that there is a different number of observations from one model to another model. This is due to the fact that 
the sources of contestability, institutions and market-structure variables are from different databases and each 
database does not necessarily hold information for all countries.   
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among banks intensifies. The coefficients of the inflation rate are mostly significantly negative, 
indicating a positive association between economic instability and intensified bank competition.   
5.2     Main results based on World Bank dataset 
[Table 3 about here] 
We estimate Eq (4) by splitting the countries into different groups of income, i.e. advanced, 
emerging and developing countries (see Table A2 in Appendix for the classification of income 
groups for each country.) Panel A and Panel B are the results for the Lerner index and the Boone 
indicator, respectively.  The model specification in the table is based on the general-to-specific 
model, where we retain the statistically significant variables, if they are found in regressions in 
either the Lerner or Boone model at least at the 10% level. In general, the findings are consistent 
between the two measures of competition in terms of the statistical significance and the sign on 
the coefficients.            
Concentration in the advanced economies has a negative coefficient, implying that in a 
concentrated banking-system, a competitive operation is enhanced. This finding supports the 
argument in the New Industrial Organization that concentration is not necessarily an inverse 
proxy of competition. Claesens and Laeven (2004) also point out that concentration and 
competition may capture different aspects of banking market-structure, and concentration is 
unlikely to be a driver of competition. Evidence for developing countries contradicts this, as the 
results indicate that concentration impairs competition, which supports the traditional hypothesis, 
demonstrating the positive effect of concentrated market on competition. Jeon et al. (2011) also 
find a similar result using time-varying H-statistics for 17 less-developed countries over the 
period of 1997-2008.  The competition in the lower-income countries is also negatively affected 
by state bank-ownership, and this, coupled with concentration, seems to be the factor to preserve 
a sustainable market-power in developing banking-systems. Jeon et al. (2011) and Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) find the significant impact of foreign bank penetration on generating competition, 
and our result is in harmony with them for emerging countries. Note also that Yeyati and Micco 
(2007) find, that while increased concentration did not weaken banking competition for Latin 
American banking sectors, foreign penetration has led to a less competitive industry.   
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We find no statistical evidence that variations in bank competition can be explained by 
regulatory variables for advanced economies. This suggests that regulations set in the context of 
macro-prudential policy may only hamper banks to take on risky projects, not affecting 
competition.  On the other hand, contestability theory is well-supported for emerging and 
developing banking-systems, in which banks with severe entry- and activity-restrictions face 
decreasing competition.  Being open to new entry should exert an important competitive pressure 
on these banking sectors.   
A distinctive feature across heterogeneous income groups is also apparent in the inter-
industry variable. The significant coefficient of insurance penetration with the negative sign that 
is found for the advanced countries in Panel A, draws attention to the fact that the super growth 
of other segments of the financial-services industry of insurance weakens market-power or 
strengthens competition in the advanced banking-sector
15
. This seems to be an advanced-market 
specific feature, since such a phenomenon is absent in less-developed financial markets.  We 
observe that financial freedom boosts competition in advanced banks, whereas the quality of 
institutional development, captured by property rights and the KKZ index, tends to yield a 
competitive environment among emerging and developing banks. The latter accords with the 
result in Delis (2012), who finds that the impact of financial reform on banking competition is 
positive if the country has a certain level of institutional quality.     
The coefficients on inflation remain significant and negative, suggesting that an unstable 
economic condition moves in tandem with intensive bank competition.     
 
5.3     Robustness test based on Clarides et al. (2013) dataset  
 [Table 4 around here] 
We run the identical regressions as in Table 3 based on the dataset of Clarides et al. (2013).  See 
Table 4, where Panel A is the result for the adjusted Lerner index, and Panel B is for the Boone 
indicator. Overall, we find consistent results with those in Table 3, and underline the robust 
                                                          
15
 This is not consistent with the Boone indicator in Panel B, since the coefficient on Insurance penetration is 
positive.  Yet, a further robustness test using the dataset of Clerides et al. (2013) supports the negative effect.     
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findings as follows: In terms of market-structure, bank concentration is positively correlated with 
the Lerner index and the Boone indicator for developing economies, confirming that 
concentration enhances competition, whereas, in reverse, concentration in the advanced banking-
sector is negatively related to the Boone indicator.  Foreign bank-ownership threatens market-
power in banks located in emerging countries, whilst state bank-ownership seems to impair bank 
competition in developing economies. We again find no evidence that contestability theory holds 
for the banking system in advanced economies. Most of the contestability variables remain to be 
significant for emerging and developing economies. The preferable effect of insurance 
penetration is still observed for advanced economies. We find that financial freedom continues to 
weaken the market power of the advanced banking sector, and the effect of property rights and 
the KKZ index remains robust for less developed countries.   
 
5.4     Further robustness test based on bank-level data 
Following Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Jeon et al (2011), our empirical testing proceeds in 
two steps.  Firstly, we estimate the measures of competition, as specified in Eqs. (1) to (3) in 
Section 3 for the Lerner index at a bank-level.  Secondly, we estimate a linear model by 
augmenting Eq. (4) with bank-specific traits as additional control variables to verify that our 
results are not affected by differences in banking management across countries.  We specify five 
bank-level variables, i.e. bank size, bank equity, share of wholesale funding, lending and bank 
fee income. Large banks may operate in international markets that are competitive, hence bank 
size may matter. It is measured by taking the natural logarithm of bank assets in US million 
dollars. It is argued that well-capitalized banks face lower funding costs and have larger net 
interest margins, hence we specify the ratio of equity to total assets. By including the share of 
wholesale funding, we are able to control the degree of dependence on money-markets for the 
source of bank funds. The higher dependence on short-term borrowing may have repercussions 
on bank competition. By introducing fee income measured by the ratio of non-interest-operating 
income to total assets as a proxy of diversification, we control for different product mixes in 
assessing the impact of bank-regulations, concentration and institutions on bank competition.  
Lending as the ratio of loans to assets is also specified. We expect that the operation of those 
banks which have the higher ratio follows traditional bank activities, implying that competition 
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among such banks may be less. The contemporaneous terms enter into the model for the bank-
specific characteristics. However, to address potential endogeneity issues with the dependent 
variable, and also correlation with the determinants, GMM is also employed here using the 
lagged variables as instrument variables.   
 [Table 5 around here] 
 The regression results based on these bank-level controlling variables are reported in 
Table 5. It appears that the relationship between banking competition and these bank-specific 
factors are independently informative. Given the negative significant coefficients on bank size 
for all income groups, the robust finding is that large banks are facing greater competition across 
countries. Evidence also suggests that an increase in diversification enhances competition for 
advanced banks, whereas it impairs competition for emerging and developing economies. The 
latter reflects the less-developed financial sector, where fee income activities are still 
underdeveloped and mainly practised in less-competitive environments. It is also found that in 
developing countries, a high capital adequacy is a source of market-power.       
While controlling the bank-specific factors, the main results in Table 3 are sustained in 
terms of statistical significance and the direction of the effect. The noteworthy points are as 
follows:  There is a clear picture that concentrated banking-systems enhance market-power for 
developing banking sectors. It is verified that foreign asset penetration enhances competition in 
emerging economies, and state bank-ownership is negatively associated with competition in 
developing economies. Contestability remains to be a strong source to boost market-power for 
less-developed countries, preserving the contestability hypothesis for emerging and developing 
income countries. Insurance and financial freedom are consistently the main drivers of greater 
competition in developed countries. The effect of the institutional factors of Property rights and 
the KKZ index on emerging and developing economies is also hardly altered by the bank-level 
data approach.   
 
7     Conclusions 
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In this paper, we attempt to investigate the driving forces of competition in banking sectors by 
distinguishing banks located in developed, emerging and developing countries. The competition 
model is estimated by employing the Lerner index and the Boone indicator for 146 countries. 
Some empirical results are diverse across different income-groups of countries.   
The evidence reveals that a more concentrated banking system seems to face greater 
competition for advanced economies, whereas it would hamper competition for developing 
economies. The nature of ownership matters for competition, specifically, the penetration of 
foreign banks seems to be beneficial to emerging economies. Developing countries with less 
state-owned bank assets have a more competitive banking sector, hence less intervention of 
government is contributory to the creation of a competitive banking-industry for low-income 
countries. Fewer entry and activity restrictions in the less-developed banking sectors are 
associated with competitive banking systems, whereas we find no evidence that contestability 
theory holds in advanced economies. Banks located in countries with good-quality institutional 
development face greater competition for emerging and developing economies. Inter-industry 
competition from insurance industries, together with financial freedom, seem to be the main 
drivers in increasing competition amongst developed economies. The enhancement of the rivalry 
from non-bank financial industries should be encouraged to prevent the dominance of the 
banking sector in developed financial markets, in this respect. Many of these results survive 
robustness tests, even after controlling for bank-specific factors.   
 Our findings advance the literature on an important topic, with direct implications for 
public policy towards banking-structure and regulations for the respective income-group of 
countries.  In particular, for the developing economies, there is scope for raising competitiveness 
by preventing excessive concentration in their banking sector. It is argued that market structure 
indicators may have become less valuable as a driving force of competition, and it necessitates a 
reassessment of competition policy (Claaessens and Laeven 2004). Our evidence suggests that 
this applies to developed and emerging countries, however, traditional competition policy in the 
financial sector may yet allow more rein to the forces of competition for low income countries.   
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Appendix  
Table A1: Sample selection and number of countries  in the sample
Al l Drop Remaining
Panel  A: Sample selection of the main dataset of the s tudy
Al l  countries  in Bank Regulation and Supervis ion Databse 180 180
Less
Countries  not included in Global  Financia l  Development Databse * 13 167
Countries  included but l imited observation of Lerner and Boone indicators  
in Global  Financia l  Development Databse **
21 146
Final  sample 146
Panel  B: Sample selection for Clerides  et a l . (2013) - for robustness
Al l  countries  148 148
Countries  not included in our main dataset (Panel  A) 20 128
Final  sample 128
Panel  C: Sample selection of bank-level  data  - for robustness
Al l  countries  in BankScope 192 192
Less
Countries  with less  than 5 banks 40 152
U.S. 1 151
Countries  not l i s ted in fina l  sample of our main dataset (Panel  A) 17 134
Final  sample 134
Criteria for selecting banks
Al l  commercia l , cooperative and savings  banks 8236 8236
Less
Inactive banks 719 7517
Al l  banks 7517
* Angui l la , Cook Is lands , Gibra l tar, Guernsey, Jersey, Montserrat, Pa lestinian, Puerto Rico, Serbia  and 
Montenegro, Ta iwan, Turks  and Caicos  Is land, Virgin Is lands , and Yugos lavia
** Aruba, Centra l  Africa  Rep., Chad, Congo Rep., Dominica, Equatoria l  Guinea, Fi ji , Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, 
Is le of Man, Kosovo, Liechtenstein, Maldives , Papua New Guinea, Sqaint Lucia , Sa int Vincent, Seychel les , 
Solomon Is lands , Tonga, Turmenistan, and Zimbabwe
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Table A2: Average of country-level  bank competi tion (WB: World Bank 1999-2011; Clerides  at a l :1999-2010)
Lerner index Boone indicator Clerides et al. (2013)
Row Country Code Economy  Obs.  Mean  Sd. Dv.  Obs.  Mean  Sd. Dv. Adj. Lerner Boone
1 Albania ALB Dev. 13 0.26 0.04 13 -0.02 0.02 0.25 -0.43
2 Algeria DZA Dev. 13 0.43 0.21 13 0.01 0.02 0.26 -0.47
3 Angola AGO Dev. 13 0.44 0.09 13 -0.07 0.03 0.26 -0.41
4 Antigua and Barbuda ATG Dev. 9 -0.48 0.30 0.18 -0.43
5 Argentina ARG Eme. 13 0.24 0.09 13 -0.03 0.10 0.14 -0.47
6 Armenia ARM Dev. 13 0.30 0.08 13 -0.22 0.03 0.26 -0.46
7 Australia AUS Adv. 12 0.11 0.04 13 0.09 0.18 0.16 -0.47
8 Austria AUT Adv. 13 0.20 0.04 13 -0.06 0.01 0.11 -0.49
9 Azerbaijan AZE Dev. 13 0.33 0.08 13 -0.10 0.03 0.27 -0.47
10 Bahrain BHR Eme. 13 0.32 0.07 13 -0.05 0.02 0.18 -0.58
11 Bangladesh BGD Eme. 13 0.28 0.11 13 -0.07 0.02 0.14 -0.44
12 Belarus BLR Dev. 12 0.21 0.05 13 0.47 0.27 0.11 -0.50
13 Belgium BEL Adv. 13 0.23 0.03 13 -0.09 0.03 0.10 -0.49
14 Belize BLZ Dev. 9 0.38 0.07 11 -0.03 0.02
15 Benin BEN Dev. 13 0.25 0.06 13 0.02 0.03
16 Bhutan BTN Dev. 13 -0.07 0.04
17 Bolivia BOL Dev. 13 0.18 0.07 13 -0.08 0.03 0.13 -0.40
18 Bosnia and Herzeg. BIH Dev. 8 0.22 0.04 13 -0.04 0.01 0.11 -0.44
19 Botswana BWA Dev. 12 0.24 0.05 13 -0.13 0.02 0.30 -0.40
20 Brazil BRA Eme. 13 0.18 0.06 13 -0.17 0.02 0.15 -0.49
21 Bulgaria BGR Eme. 11 0.35 0.04 13 -0.09 0.02 0.29 -0.41
22 Burkina Faso BFA Dev. 13 0.30 0.04 13 -0.09 0.02 0.23 -0.40
23 Burundi BDI Dev. 13 0.39 0.10 13 -0.15 0.05
24 Cambodia KHM Dev. 11 0.38 0.09 11 0.03 0.07 0.32 -0.44
25 Cameroon CMR Dev. 13 0.42 0.07 13 -0.04 0.01 0.31 -0.41
26 Canada CAN Adv. 12 0.18 0.03 13 -0.11 0.03 0.17 -0.40
27 Cayman Islands CYM Dev. 12 0.32 0.07 13 -0.04 0.02
28 Chile CHL Eme. 12 0.27 0.07 13 -0.05 0.03 0.20 -0.45
29 China CHN Eme. 12 0.36 0.10 13 -0.02 0.01 0.30 -0.41
30 Colombia COL Eme. 13 0.23 0.10 13 -0.07 0.02 0.16 -0.42
31 Costa Rica CRI Dev. 13 0.20 0.07 13 -0.08 0.02 0.16 -0.48
32 Cote d'Ivoire CIV Dev. 13 0.24 0.03 13 -0.06 0.02 0.19 -0.40
33 Croatia HRV Dev. 13 0.22 0.05 13 -0.10 0.02 0.21 -0.42
34 Cyprus CYP Adv. 13 0.22 0.07 13 0.01 0.03 0.13 -0.45
35 Czech Republic CZE Adv. 13 0.16 0.07 13 -0.21 0.12 0.25 -0.42
36 Denmark DNK Adv. 12 0.26 0.10 13 -0.07 0.02 0.16 -0.50
37 Dominican Republic DOM Dev. 13 0.19 0.06 13 -0.23 0.06 0.17 -0.46
38 Ecuador ECU Dev. 12 0.14 0.07 12 -0.02 0.02 0.16 -0.42
39 Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY Eme. 5 0.14 0.19 13 -0.08 0.01 0.20 -0.43
40 El Salvador SLV Dev. 13 0.37 0.10 13 -0.09 0.08 0.20 -0.42
41 Estonia EST Adv. 12 0.20 0.08 13 0.08 0.06 0.19 -0.44
42 Ethiopia ETH Dev. 13 0.48 0.09 13 -0.03 0.01 0.46 -0.42
43 Finland FIN Adv. 10 -0.07 0.55 13 0.42 1.79 0.23 -0.39
44 France FRA Adv. 13 0.17 0.05 13 -0.05 0.01 0.15 -0.46
45 Gabon GAB Dev. 13 -0.04 0.01
46 Gambia, The GMB Dev. 13 0.35 0.15 12 0.06 0.07 0.41 -0.39
47 Georgia GEO Dev. 13 0.33 0.08 13 -0.10 0.03 0.21 -0.48
48 Germany DEU Adv. 12 0.16 0.03 13 -0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.42
49 Ghana GHA Dev. 12 0.33 0.13 13 -0.19 0.02 0.31 -0.41
50 Greece GRC Adv. 11 0.23 0.14 8 -0.07 0.08 0.10 -0.41
51 Grenada GRD Dev. 13 -0.08 0.04
52 Guatemala GTM Dev. 13 -0.13 0.05 0.19 -0.50
53 Guinea GIN Dev. 10 0.03 0.06
54 Guyana GUY Dev. 13 -0.05 0.01
55 Honduras HND Dev. 13 0.18 0.05 13 -0.04 0.02 0.16 -0.42
56 Hong Kong SAR, China HKG Adv. 12 0.30 0.08 13 -0.07 0.19 0.25 -0.46
57 Hungary HUN Eme. 13 0.09 0.06 13 -0.09 0.03 0.13 -0.45
58 Iceland ISL Adv. 12 0.18 0.13 8 -0.10 0.10 0.20 -0.56
59 India IND Eme. 13 0.24 0.04 13 -0.06 0.01 0.14 -0.46
60 Indonesia IDN Eme. 13 0.17 0.06 13 -0.03 0.01 0.19 -0.48
61 Ireland IRL Adv. 12 0.22 0.05 13 -0.01 0.01
62 Israel ISR Adv. 12 0.19 0.03 13 -0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.43
63 Italy ITA Adv. 12 0.19 0.03 13 -0.04 0.03 0.17 -0.42
64 Jamaica JAM Dev. 11 0.32 0.05 9 -0.09 0.01 0.26 -0.43
65 Japan JPN Adv. 13 0.21 0.14 13 -0.02 0.01 0.14 -0.35
66 Jordan JOR Eme. 13 0.32 0.09 13 -0.06 0.01 0.27 -0.42
67 Kazakhstan KAZ Dev. 13 0.29 0.05 13 -0.07 0.04 0.20 -0.54
68 Kenya KEN Dev. 13 0.28 0.08 13 -0.07 0.01 0.29 -0.39
69 Korea, Rep. KOR Adv. 12 0.31 0.03 10 0.07 0.06 0.14 -0.52
70 Kuwait KWT Eme. 13 0.47 0.08 13 -0.08 0.03 0.41 -0.52
71 Kyrgyz Republic KGZ Dev. 11 0.38 0.13 11 -0.01 0.05 0.30 -0.41
72 Latvia LVA Eme. 13 0.21 0.06 13 -0.04 0.03 0.23 -0.43
73 Lebanon LBN Dev. 13 0.17 0.04 13 -0.07 0.01 0.13 -0.56
74 Lesotho LSO Dev. 13 0.00 0.02
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Lerner index Boone indicator Clerides et al. (2013)
Row Country Code Economy  Obs.  Mean  Sd. Dv.  Obs.  Mean  Sd. Dv. Adj. Lerner Boone
75 Lithuania LTU Eme. 12 0.14 0.05 13 -0.03 0.05 0.18 -0.42
76 Luxembourg LUX Adv. 13 0.10 0.06 13 -0.05 0.01 0.16 -0.50
77 Macao SAR, China MAC Dev. 13 0.14 0.08 13 0.01 0.01 0.26 -0.45
78 Macedonia, FYR MKD Dev. 13 0.27 0.05 13 -0.08 0.01 0.19 -0.41
79 Madagascar MDG Dev. 13 0.34 0.08 13 -0.02 0.02 0.35 -0.41
80 Malawi MWI Dev. 12 0.26 0.09 13 -0.09 0.02 0.36 -0.45
81 Malaysia MYS Eme. 13 0.30 0.18 13 -0.03 0.01 0.28 -0.41
82 Mali MLI Dev. 13 0.27 0.05 13 -0.09 0.01 0.19 -0.40
83 Malta MLT Adv. 12 0.24 0.07 13 -0.05 0.01 0.28 -0.44
84 Mauritius MUS Eme. 13 0.42 0.12 13 -0.05 0.01 0.25 -0.54
85 Mexico MEX Eme. 13 -0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.62
86 Moldova MDA Dev. 13 0.27 0.09 13 -0.13 0.04 0.29 -0.47
87 Montenegro MNE Dev. 10 0.04 0.07 9 -0.05 0.04 0.11 -0.40
88 Morocco MAR Eme. 13 0.27 0.05 13 -0.03 0.01 0.23 -0.42
89 Mozambique MOZ Dev. 12 0.24 0.07 13 2.25 1.24 0.26 -0.40
90 Myanmar MMR Dev. 7 -0.07 0.12
91 Namibia NAM Dev. 8 0.03 0.03 0.19 -0.45
92 Nepal NPL Dev. 13 0.20 0.22 13 -0.07 0.01 0.30 -0.44
93 Netherlands NLD Adv. 12 0.17 0.03 13 0.03 0.04 0.15 -0.50
94 New Zealand NZL Adv. 13 0.15 0.05 13 -0.24 0.31 0.19 -0.50
95 Nicaragua NIC Dev. 13 -0.01 0.02 0.24 -0.42
96 Niger NER Dev. 13 0.20 0.14 13 -0.11 0.04 0.17 -0.40
97 Nigeria NGA Eme. 13 0.21 0.25 13 -0.07 0.03 0.23 -0.42
98 Norway NOR Adv. 12 0.22 0.06 13 -0.01 0.05 0.18 -0.45
99 Oman OMN Eme. 13 0.40 0.05 13 -0.01 0.02 0.29 -0.41
100 Pakistan PAK Eme. 13 0.15 0.11 13 -0.03 0.03 0.20 -0.45
101 Panama PAN Dev. 13 0.38 0.05 13 -0.11 0.02 0.25 -0.44
102 Paraguay PRY Dev. 13 0.09 0.13 13 -0.15 0.16 0.07 -0.57
103 Peru PER Eme. 13 0.31 0.08 13 -0.04 0.02 0.22 -0.41
104 Philippines PHL Eme. 13 0.11 0.12 13 -0.17 0.16 0.17 -0.43
105 Poland POL Eme. 13 0.19 0.07 13 -0.12 0.03 0.15 -0.45
106 Portugal PRT Adv. 13 0.28 0.11 13 -0.11 0.07 0.12 -0.53
107 Qatar QAT Eme. 13 0.47 0.09 13 0.02 0.04 0.39 -0.45
108 Romania ROM Eme. 13 0.22 0.05 13 -0.06 0.04 0.17 -0.51
109 Russian Federation RUS Eme. 13 0.17 0.09 13 -0.04 0.01 0.27 -0.48
110 Rwanda RWA Dev. 13 0.31 0.09 11 -0.17 0.02 0.21 -0.39
111 Saint Kitts and Nevis KNA Dev. 13 -0.03 0.03
112 Samoa WSM Dev. 13 -0.02 0.03
113 Saudi Arabia SAU Eme. 13 0.47 0.10 13 -0.05 0.02 0.30 -0.42
114 Senegal SEN Dev. 13 0.33 0.03 13 -0.07 0.01 0.27 -0.40
115 Serbia SRB Dev. 11 0.24 0.12 13 -0.36 0.44 0.17 -0.41
116 Sierra Leone SLE Dev. 12 0.35 0.20 12 -0.10 0.05 0.37 -0.40
117 Singapore SGP Adv. 13 0.21 0.13 13 -0.01 0.05 0.32 -0.47
118 Slovak Republic SVK Adv. 13 0.14 0.07 13 -0.10 0.03 0.21 -0.45
119 Slovenia SVN Adv. 13 0.25 0.04 13 -0.11 0.03 0.16 -0.44
120 South Africa ZAF Eme. 13 0.25 0.04 11 -0.10 0.04 0.15 -0.44
121 Spain ESP Adv. 13 0.16 0.08 13 0.18 0.14 0.19 -0.49
122 Sri Lanka LKA Eme. 12 0.20 0.04 13 -0.18 0.03 0.13 -0.51
123 Sudan SDN Eme. 13 0.31 0.12 13 0.01 0.03 0.18 -0.49
124 Suriname SUR Dev. 13 -0.02 0.02
125 Swaziland SWZ Dev. 12 0.19 0.05 13 -0.56 0.23
126 Sweden SWE Adv. 13 0.23 0.05 13 -0.05 0.02 0.19 -0.47
127 Switzerland CHE Adv. 13 0.21 0.03 13 -0.06 0.01 0.12 -0.45
128 Syrian Arab Republic SYR Dev. 7 0.28 0.19 7 0.07 0.09 0.42 -0.43
129 Tajikistan TJK Dev. 7 -0.22 0.95
130 Tanzania TZA Dev. 9 0.33 0.07 9 -0.09 0.03 0.36 -0.37
131 Thailand THA Eme. 13 0.11 0.23 13 -0.05 0.01 0.21 -0.42
132 Togo TGO Dev. 13 0.25 0.09 12 -0.10 0.04 0.27 -0.40
133 Trinidad and Tobago TTO Dev. 12 0.34 0.04 13 0.02 0.05 0.30 -0.45
134 Tunisia TUN Eme. 13 0.24 0.05 13 -0.03 0.01 0.19 -0.47
135 Turkey TUR Eme. 12 0.21 0.06 13 -0.15 0.26 0.17 -0.57
136 Uganda UGA Dev. 5 0.33 0.05 13 -0.11 0.01 0.33 -0.39
137 Ukraine UKR Eme. 12 0.21 0.10 13 -0.14 0.26 0.13 -0.52
138 United Arab Emirates ARE Eme. 13 0.42 0.09 13 -0.04 0.01 0.36 -0.45
139 United Kingdom GBR Adv. 13 0.23 0.09 13 -0.04 0.01 0.19 -0.44
140 United States USA Adv. 13 0.27 0.05 13 -0.07 0.01 0.22 -0.40
141 Uruguay URY Dev. 13 0.11 0.09 13 -0.07 0.06 0.13 -0.50
142 Vanuatu VUT Dev. 9 -0.01 0.01
143 Venezuela, RB VEN Eme. 13 0.24 0.06 13 -0.13 0.03 0.22 -0.41
144 Vietnam VNM Eme. 13 0.25 0.04 13 -0.07 0.01 0.23 -0.49
145 Yemen, Rep. YEM Dev. 13 0.01 0.02 0.14 -0.46
146 Zambia ZMB Dev. 13 0.18 0.15 13 -0.12 0.04 0.20 -0.38
Mean 12.4 0.25 0.08 12.5 -0.05 0.07 0.21 -0.45
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Table A3: Defini tion of variables
Variable Description Source
i. Dependent variables
Lerner index A measure of market power in the banking market. It compares output 
pricing and marginal costs (that is, markup). An increase in the Lerner 
index indicates a deterioration of the competitive conduct of financial 
intermediaries.
World Bank: The Global 
Financial Development 
Database. Čihák et al. 
(2012).
Boone indicator A measure of degree of competition based on profit-efficiency in the 
banking market. It is calculated as the elasticity of profits to marginal 
costs. An increase in the Boone indicator implies a deterioration of the 
competitive conduct of financial intermediaries.
World Bank: The Global 
Financial Development 
Database. Čihák et al. 
(2012).
ii. Explanatory variables
Market structure
Concentration Assets of five largest banks as a share of total commercial banking 
assets. Total assets include total earning assets, cash and due from 
banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed assets, goodwill, other intangibles, 
current tax assets, deferred tax, discontinued operations and other 
assets.
World Bank: The Global 
Financial Development 
Database. Čihák et al. 
(2012).
Number of banks to 
population
The ratio of the number of banks in the country per 100,000 people. Barth et al. (2001) and 
authors' calculation based 
on BankScope for missing 
countries
Foreign bank ownership The extent to which the banking system's assets are foreign owned 
which is the fraction of the banking system's assets that is 50% or more 
foreign owned.
World Bank surveys on 
bank regulation. Surveys 
on bank regulation were 
conducted in 1999, 2003, 
2007, and 2011, covering 
180 countries . Barth et al. 
(2013)
State bank ownership The extent to which the banking system's assets are government 
owned which is the fraction of the banking system's assets that is 50% 
or more government owned.
World Bank surveys on 
bank regulation. Surveys 
on bank regulation were 
conducted in 1999, 2003, 
2007, and 2011, covering 
180 countries . Barth et al. 
(2013)
Market contestability
Activity restriction A variable that ranges from zero to twelve, with twelve indicating the 
highest restrictions on bank activities. The activity restrictions include 
restrictions on securities activities, insurance activities, and real 
estate activities. A value of 1 is added to the index if an activity is 
unrestricted, 2 if it is permitted, 3 if it is restricted, and 4 if it is 
prohibited.
World Bank surveys on 
bank regulation. Surveys 
on bank regulation were 
conducted in 1999, 2003, 
2007, and 2011, covering 
180 countries . Barth et al. 
(2013)
Financial conglomerate A variable that ranges from zero to twelve, with twelve indicating the 
highest restrictions on bank conglomerate. The financial conglomerate 
includes the extent to which banks may own and control nonfinancial 
firms, the extent to which nonfinancial firms may own and control 
banks, and the extent to which nonbank financial firms may own and 
control banks.
World Bank surveys on 
bank regulation. Surveys 
on bank regulation were 
conducted in 1999, 2003, 
2007, and 2011, covering 
180 countries . Barth et al. 
(2013)
Limit on foreign bank A variable that measures whether foreign banks may own domestic 
banks and whether foreign banks may enter a country's banking 
industry. It examines are foreign entities prohibited from entering 
through: Acquisition, Subsidiary, and Branch? The indicator ranges 
from zero to four, with Lower values indicate greater stringency.
World Bank surveys on 
bank regulation. Surveys 
on bank regulation were 
conducted in 1999, 2003, 
2007, and 2011, covering 
180 countries . Barth et al. 
(2013)
Entry requirment Entry requirement measures whether various types of legal 
submissions are required to obtain a banking license. It examines 
whether the eight documents (such as draft by-laws, intended 
organization chart) are legally required to be submitted before 
issuance of the banking license. The indicator ranges from zero to 
eight, with higher values indicate greater stringency.
World Bank surveys on 
bank regulation. Surveys 
on bank regulation were 
conducted in 1999, 2003, 
2007, and 2011, covering 
180 countries . Barth et al. 
(2013)
28 
 
Fraction denied  The percentage of applications (both domestic and foreign) to enter 
banking denied in the past five years. 
World Bank surveys on 
bank regulation. Surveys 
on bank regulation were 
conducted in 1999, 2003, 
2007, and 2011, covering 
180 countries . Barth et al. 
(2013)
Inter-industry
Insurance penetration Ratio of life and non-life insurance premium volume to GDP. Premium 
volume is the insurer's direct premiums earned (if Property/Casualty) 
or received (if Life/Health) during the previous calendar year.
World Bank: The Global 
Financial Development 
Database. Čihák et al. 
(2012).Market capitalization Stock market capitalization of listed companies to GDP. Market 
capitalization is calculated by multiplying a company's shares 
outstanding by the current market price of one share.
World Bank: World 
Development Iindicators.
Stock market efficiency Stock market turnover ratio as an indicator of market efficiency. 
Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded during the period 
divided by the average market capitalization for the period.
World Bank: World 
Development Iindicators.
Institution
Financial freedom Financial freedom is a measure of banking efficiency as well as a 
measure of independence from government control and interference 
in the financial sector. The Index scores an economy’s financial 
freedom by looking into five broad areas: i) The extent of government 
regulation of financial services, ii) The degree of state intervention in 
banks and other financial firms through direct and indirect ownership, 
iii) The extent of financial and capital market development, iv) 
Government influence on the allocation of credit, and v) Openness to 
foreign competition. An overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 is given to 
an economy’s financial freedom through deductions from the ideal 
score of 100.
Heritage Foundation 
Database.
Property rights Property right measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect 
private property rights and the degree to which its government 
enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private 
property will be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the 
judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the 
ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. It ranges 
from 0 to 100. A higher score indicates better protection of property 
rights and signify greater protection of private property rights. 
Heritage Foundation 
Database.
KKZ  index KKZ institution index is an aggregate indicator of the quality of 
institutional development in the country. The index is calculated using 
the average indicators of information on six issues: voice 
accountability, political stability, government’s effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Higher value 
indicates higher institutional quality.
Worldwide Governance 
Indicator. Kaufman et al. 
(2010).
Macroeconomics
Log (GDP per capita) Natural logharithem of real GDP per capita. World Bank: World 
Development Iindicators.
Bank credit growth Bank credit growth is the growth of domestic credit provided by 
banking sector to GDP. Domestic credit provided by the banking sector 
includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the 
exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The 
banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money 
banks, as well as other banking institution.
World Bank: World 
Development Iindicators.
GDP growth The real annual growth of GDP. World Bank: World 
Development Iindicators.
Inflation The annual change in the consumer price index. World Bank: World 
Development Iindicators.
Bank-level variables
Log (size) Natural logharithem of a bank total assets. BankScope.
Capital adequacy The ratio of equity to  total assets of a bank. BankScope.
Share of wholesale funding The ratio of money market funding to total deposits of a bank. BankScope.
Efficiency Inverse of a bank's overhead costs to total assets. BankScope.
Diversification The ratio of non-interest income to total income of a bank. BankScope.
Stability A measure of a bank soundness calculated as return on assets plus 
capital ratio divided by volatility of return on assets. 
BankScope.
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Table A4: Average of country-level  bank market s tructure, regulation and insti tutions  over 1999-2011
Market structure Market contestability Inter-industry Institution 
Row Code Concent.
Foreign 
bank 
own.
State  
bank 
own.
Activity 
rest.
Financial 
conglom.
Limit on 
foreign 
banks Entry req.
Fraction 
denied 
Insurance 
penetrati
on
Stock 
market 
capital.
Stock 
market 
efficiency
Financial 
freedom
Property 
right KKZ index
1 ALB 86.34 42.30 57.70 7.00 7.00 8.00 0.00 0.53 54.62 30.77 -0.37
2 DZA 94.30 6.97 92.89 5.50 9.00 4.00 7.50 0.00 0.59 35.38 33.08 -0.84
3 AGO 90.04 46.28 28.91 6.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.03 38.75 23.75 -1.20
4 ATG 100.00 58.40 0.00 7.00 6.67 4.00 8.00 6.65 0.75
5 ARG 55.48 34.73 35.29 7.31 5.62 3.80 6.77 0.15 2.41 37.27 9.67 44.62 36.92 -0.28
6 ARM 83.27 51.34 0.77 8.62 5.85 3.20 7.69 0.23 1.00 4.81 71.54 43.08 -0.31
7 AUS 88.48 16.19 0.00 7.54 7.08 4.00 7.69 0.00 6.69 113.69 80.31 90.00 90.00 1.60
8 AUT 75.17 12.85 2.20 4.62 5.00 4.00 7.92 0.07 4.94 26.18 43.32 70.00 90.00 1.62
9 AZE 66.97 10.45 31.35 9.00 6.00 7.00 0.25 0.45 32.31 28.08 -0.86
10 BHR 95.00 61.68 1.57 7.85 5.77 4.00 8.00 0.22 1.99 105.24 4.70 80.77 62.31 0.20
11 BGD 58.90 7.72 55.65 9.11 11.00 4.00 6.08 0.83 0.73 7.09 81.65 24.62 27.69 -0.93
12 BLR 94.87 15.95 72.13 9.08 6.15 3.00 7.31 0.40 0.66 22.31 26.15 -0.94
13 BEL 92.71 28.70 0.00 6.23 5.31 4.00 7.92 0.00 8.16 65.70 41.43 72.31 86.15 1.33
14 BLZ 100.00 73.89 0.00 10.44 6.50 4.00 8.00 0.53 3.62 50.00 50.00 -0.02
15 BEN 98.83 91.00 0.00 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 0.73 52.31 33.08 -0.23
16 BTN 17.11 64.39 9.46 9.08 4.00 7.62 0.85 30.00 60.00 0.11
17 BOL 90.59 37.20 2.23 8.67 8.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.20 17.81 0.93 64.62 30.38 -0.52
18 BIH 69.97 67.47 13.96 6.69 6.69 4.00 7.92 0.00 1.70 50.77 10.77 -0.40
19 BWA 97.65 95.78 4.22 8.38 6.15 3.00 7.92 0.37 2.42 27.48 3.38 70.00 70.38 0.70
20 BRA 61.10 21.82 42.95 6.77 4.85 4.00 8.00 0.24 1.89 51.78 49.26 48.46 50.00 0.03
21 BGR 76.65 74.17 11.17 7.15 5.92 4.00 8.00 0.16 1.98 15.44 15.97 58.46 37.69 0.20
22 BFA 89.39 56.00 0.00 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 0.59 46.92 33.08 -0.32
23 BDI 100.00 4.34 36.46 8.85 8.69 4.00 7.38 0.24 0.88 30.00 28.13 -1.25
24 KHM 84.04 35.50 8.00 9.00 4.50 8.00 0.67 0.10 56.15 30.00 -0.83
25 CMR 88.78 0.00 0.00 7.50 5.50 4.00 8.00 0.83 46.15 30.00 -0.88
26 CAN 83.82 6.00 0.00 5.08 8.38 4.00 8.00 0.06 5.52 114.75 73.74 73.08 90.00 1.62
27 CYM 85.00 98.21 0.00 6.11 4.33 4.00 7.11 0.00 0.18 45.38 26.15 1.16
28 CHL 68.14 46.91 14.42 9.08 7.85 3.20 4.00 0.06 3.47 103.79 14.85 65.38 89.23 1.17
29 CHN 70.69 1.89 68.76 10.89 8.00 4.00 7.00 2.44 62.77 131.23 33.08 26.15 -0.54
30 COL 77.67 19.80 15.60 9.78 9.56 2.80 8.00 0.00 1.90 32.60 10.04 66.15 39.23 -0.48
31 CRI 73.81 23.99 57.87 10.22 6.00 2.56 6.67 0.00 1.86 9.97 5.29 48.46 50.38 0.57
32 CIV 89.09 84.20 10.60 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 1.22 20.45 2.38 60.77 30.00 -1.24
33 HRV 74.13 64.46 14.28 6.00 5.46 4.00 6.85 0.63 2.48 34.82 5.62 58.46 31.54 0.34
34 CYP 96.81 21.36 3.32 7.00 8.11 4.00 5.85 0.04 4.43 49.97 38.88 70.00 85.38 1.03
35 CZE 79.90 66.80 8.43 7.67 6.67 4.00 8.00 0.00 3.57 23.74 56.93 86.15 69.23 0.84
36 DNK 89.65 11.62 0.05 6.38 6.69 4.00 8.00 0.04 8.21 62.67 79.52 85.38 90.38 1.86
37 DOM 82.03 8.45 26.29 10.80 4.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.37 43.08 30.00 -0.35
38 ECU 71.97 6.03 14.51 9.60 8.00 4.00 8.00 0.50 1.59 7.56 4.39 45.38 31.15 -0.77
39 EGY 69.83 13.07 66.00 8.00 7.00 4.00 7.38 0.78 0.71 49.45 35.68 38.46 46.15 -0.52
40 SLV 89.06 28.17 5.12 9.54 10.11 4.00 7.69 0.16 1.72 19.58 3.15 70.00 52.31 -0.16
41 EST 99.88 94.75 0.00 5.08 5.85 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.90 26.18 20.85 82.31 76.15 0.99
42 ETH 96.73 0.00 70.98 10.00 9.20 0.00 5.60 0.00 0.61 26.15 30.00 -0.97
43 FIN 99.07 27.60 6.74 5.92 4.62 4.00 5.23 0.05 3.82 119.20 110.42 69.23 90.38 1.89
44 FRA 73.09 14.86 0.56 5.23 5.00 4.00 6.46 0.00 8.84 82.59 94.96 56.92 71.54 1.23
45 GAB 0.00 0.00 7.50 5.50 4.00 8.00 1.06 46.15 46.15 -0.48
46 GMB 99.44 85.38 0.00 10.78 8.31 4.00 7.56 0.00 47.69 40.38 -0.42
47 GEO 94.20 29.10 0.00 6.00 9.00 7.00 0.27 0.39 5.63 6.03 50.00 33.85 -0.39
48 DEU 85.96 5.53 40.64 4.33 5.33 4.00 5.33 0.00 5.36 48.04 130.43 53.08 90.00 1.47
49 GHA 74.00 52.03 22.59 8.92 5.31 2.80 8.00 0.47 0.95 13.36 3.01 50.77 50.00 0.00
50 GRC 87.19 9.34 17.11 6.92 5.22 4.00 7.31 0.06 1.66 59.48 56.18 47.69 55.38 0.64
51 GRD 88.70 0.00 7.00 6.67 4.00 8.00 8.20 0.45
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Market structure Market contestability Inter-industry Institution 
Row Code Concent.
Foreign 
bank 
own.
State  
bank 
own.
Activity 
rest.
Financial 
conglom.
Limit on 
foreign 
banks Entry req.
Fraction 
denied 
Insurance 
penetrati
on
Stock 
market 
capital.
Stock 
market 
efficiency
Financial 
freedom
Property 
right KKZ index
52 GTM 66.05 8.16 4.48 9.00 7.08 4.00 7.38 0.27 0.98 61.54 35.38 -0.60
53 GIN 90.00 0.00 3.00 9.00 8.00 0.33 0.06 53.08 27.69 -1.22
54 GUY 32.92 10.46 10.15 6.92 4.00 7.69 0.20 4.55 52.31 45.00 -0.36
55 HND 68.90 20.18 0.60 7.33 8.50 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.63 57.69 36.15 -0.57
56 HKG 82.77 0.00 3.44 7.00 4.00 6.11 0.00 8.49 407.70 80.77 90.00 90.00 1.38
57 HUN 85.47 82.33 3.84 7.46 6.54 4.00 7.69 0.15 3.04 24.50 79.77 69.23 69.23 0.87
58 ISL 0.00 22.81 7.46 5.38 4.00 7.69 0.00 2.62 85.07 57.69 62.31 90.00 1.70
59 IND 42.53 4.89 76.21 8.69 8.46 4.00 6.15 0.57 2.87 61.89 131.80 32.31 50.00 -0.26
60 IDN 64.20 24.55 40.93 10.56 8.40 4.00 7.56 0.08 1.29 31.42 49.73 33.85 33.08 -0.65
61 IRL 90.36 62.90 20.69 5.23 5.69 4.00 5.23 0.00 8.93 53.83 45.95 84.62 90.00 1.52
62 ISR 91.34 1.48 36.88 9.69 8.77 4.00 4.31 0.13 4.52 78.14 56.92 55.38 70.00 0.56
63 ITA 71.21 8.09 11.17 7.92 7.31 4.00 8.00 0.18 6.44 40.38 132.73 64.62 61.15 0.63
64 JAM 97.42 72.43 24.89 9.56 7.33 4.00 8.00 0.67 3.81 72.23 2.81 56.15 51.92 -0.04
65 JPN 52.87 6.23 0.58 8.67 7.33 4.00 6.67 0.00 7.44 77.64 103.70 46.92 76.15 1.14
66 JOR 98.43 47.20 0.00 7.54 6.33 3.80 7.69 0.70 1.76 137.54 36.11 66.15 56.15 -0.01
67 KAZ 75.72 12.35 2.33 7.33 8.00 3.00 7.69 0.00 0.63 22.91 10.92 43.08 30.00 -0.60
68 KEN 68.43 38.78 1.02 8.54 8.08 4.00 7.69 0.68 2.25 28.63 7.49 53.08 43.46 -0.71
69 KOR 73.82 32.11 28.94 7.46 7.78 4.00 7.67 0.00 10.51 72.94 243.38 54.62 76.15 0.69
70 KWT 92.26 0.00 0.00 6.46 6.62 3.60 6.46 0.41 0.58 97.98 61.76 50.00 62.69 0.23
71 KGZ 100.00 32.55 12.39 5.67 8.00 3.56 8.00 0.04 0.14 1.56 188.61 50.00 28.85 -0.86
72 LVA 68.61 60.07 5.06 5.62 4.69 4.00 8.00 0.08 1.61 8.60 11.51 66.15 51.15 0.60
73 LBN 63.08 34.49 1.00 8.54 5.54 3.20 8.00 0.00 1.86 21.84 11.17 67.69 34.23 -0.56
74 LSO 84.07 23.39 9.33 10.50 4.00 8.00 0.50 4.81 44.62 46.15 -0.19
75 LTU 90.11 84.45 17.28 7.23 6.77 4.00 8.00 0.22 1.36 17.56 11.96 72.31 51.15 0.66
76 LUX 43.57 94.66 5.07 4.85 7.67 4.00 8.00 0.00 5.42 163.53 1.05 83.08 90.00 1.71
77 MAC 95.36 54.09 0.69 7.00 6.77 4.00 7.38 0.53 1.94 70.00 60.00 0.75
78 MKD 86.54 65.03 1.14 7.33 6.67 3.00 8.00 0.50 1.75 8.71 174.76 65.00 31.00 -0.29
79 MDG 100.00 74.24 0.00 8.20 6.80 3.00 7.56 0.14 0.60 46.92 48.85 -0.34
80 MWI 99.86 19.77 24.06 10.22 6.56 3.00 7.89 0.26 1.57 19.45 3.21 45.38 47.69 -0.37
81 MYS 77.97 19.63 0.00 7.67 9.00 3.00 7.38 0.00 4.55 139.69 33.08 38.46 53.46 0.36
82 MLI 95.43 67.00 21.80 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 0.47 41.54 39.62 -0.29
83 MLT 99.62 59.95 0.00 7.69 6.69 4.00 8.00 0.00 4.55 46.32 4.97 64.62 84.62 1.19
84 MUS 83.37 41.10 0.82 9.69 8.00 4.00 7.69 0.00 4.51 45.73 6.32 66.92 66.15 0.74
85 MEX 74.40 62.72 12.56 7.08 6.00 3.00 8.00 1.57 28.64 28.16 58.46 50.00 -0.08
86 MDA 74.81 30.78 7.32 8.38 6.08 4.00 8.00 0.27 1.02 3.25 80.20 50.00 47.69 -0.47
87 MNE 93.16 88.40 5.00 6.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 69.74 9.22 42.00 36.00 -0.09
88 MAR 85.34 20.36 29.30 8.62 5.85 4.00 8.00 0.15 2.35 52.33 19.52 46.92 36.92 -0.30
89 MOZ 97.17 93.95 0.00 7.60 8.60 4.00 8.00 0.00 0.85 53.08 30.00 -0.32
90 MMR 100.00 69.00 8.00 10.00 8.00 0.06 -1.68
91 NAM 98.56 73.27 0.00 6.89 7.60 4.00 8.00 0.75 7.57 8.27 2.77 53.85 48.46 0.28
92 NPL 62.34 31.50 20.86 7.40 3.00 8.00 0.92 21.17 5.14 30.00 33.46 -0.86
93 NLD 90.18 5.55 5.48 4.69 4.69 4.00 8.00 0.00 6.41 101.52 133.62 87.69 90.00 1.70
94 NZL 97.10 98.38 0.69 3.46 3.31 4.00 6.69 0.05 2.92 39.93 43.50 86.15 91.15 1.75
95 NIC 94.14 12.52 0.11 10.50 10.89 3.60 8.00 0.05 1.39 58.46 28.08 -0.53
96 NER 100.00 73.40 0.00 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 0.51 40.77 31.54 -0.62
97 NGA 60.39 1.47 6.67 7.44 6.38 3.00 8.00 0.00 0.61 18.70 13.20 34.62 31.54 -1.14
98 NOR 97.73 22.03 0.00 6.33 8.22 4.00 7.89 0.00 4.83 52.35 109.85 52.31 90.00 1.68
99 OMN 98.09 7.67 0.00 8.92 9.08 3.40 8.00 0.64 1.05 30.70 23.57 50.00 51.54 0.32
100 PAK 65.53 36.71 35.04 9.33 7.89 4.00 7.38 0.00 0.63 22.25 253.74 42.31 30.00 -1.01
101 PAN 63.92 50.75 11.82 8.00 5.31 4.00 8.00 0.03 2.63 29.32 2.09 76.92 36.15 0.09
102 PRY 68.51 74.85 8.53 8.80 9.00 4.00 7.56 0.00 1.00 3.52 1.84 56.92 30.38 -0.81
103 PER 87.19 42.58 4.59 6.92 5.69 4.00 7.69 0.16 1.09 43.24 8.17 66.15 40.00 -0.33
104 PHL 69.77 13.53 11.85 5.00 8.00 3.40 7.69 0.34 1.28 49.16 21.59 48.46 40.77 -0.47
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Market structure Market contestability Inter-industry Institution 
Row Code Concent.
Foreign 
bank 
own.
State  
bank 
own.
Activity 
rest.
Financial 
conglom.
Limit on 
foreign 
banks Entry req.
Fraction 
denied 
Insurance 
penetrati
on
Stock 
market 
capital.
Stock 
market 
efficiency
Financial 
freedom
Property 
right KKZ index
105 POL 71.32 55.54 28.62 7.31 4.54 4.00 7.31 0.00 2.95 26.80 40.50 60.77 58.85 0.63
106 PRT 93.06 15.67 22.85 7.15 6.38 4.00 7.31 0.00 6.71 40.32 64.11 52.31 70.00 1.09
107 QAT 98.11 11.92 44.70 5.78 8.00 6.67 0.00 1.14 100.43 24.06 43.85 52.69 0.49
108 ROM 82.26 33.92 50.57 8.62 6.23 4.00 8.00 0.31 1.30 13.75 15.34 47.69 31.92 0.05
109 RUS 42.27 9.42 46.83 5.92 5.38 3.00 8.00 1.53 54.67 58.41 36.92 33.46 -0.73
110 RWA 93.02 25.00 28.30 8.00 6.00 8.00 0.33 0.60 33.85 25.77 -0.66
111 KNA 55.55 35.65 7.00 6.67 4.00 8.00 0.74
112 WSM 83.76 0.00 10.00 6.60 4.00 8.00 1.00 40.00 54.17 0.45
113 SAU 77.54 10.35 13.73 8.33 6.00 4.00 8.00 0.36 80.94 120.05 40.77 49.62 -0.35
114 SEN 85.33 78.70 0.00 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 1.10 46.15 48.85 -0.22
115 SRB 65.80 73.50 17.90 7.00 8.00 3.00 8.00 0.00 1.89 24.41 14.73 42.00 36.00 -0.41
116 SLE 94.08 62.29 37.71 6.00 8.00 4.00 8.00 0.29 0.38 29.09 13.64 -0.88
117 SGP 97.77 52.33 0.00 6.38 7.00 4.00 8.00 6.78 183.23 68.38 61.54 90.00 1.47
118 SVK 89.20 80.18 9.67 7.46 6.77 4.00 8.00 0.60 3.10 5.85 23.47 71.54 50.38 0.72
119 SVN 77.38 15.91 25.47 7.23 6.62 4.00 7.69 0.00 3.65 23.85 14.53 51.54 56.92 0.95
120 ZAF 98.60 19.63 0.01 6.92 5.62 3.20 7.31 0.16 14.06 194.46 47.87 56.92 50.00 0.34
121 ESP 84.78 9.75 0.00 5.31 5.08 4.00 8.00 0.03 5.06 84.12 166.26 73.85 70.00 1.02
122 LKA 88.46 6.91 36.55 7.23 8.00 4.00 8.00 0.57 1.31 18.79 18.64 44.62 49.23 -0.33
123 SDN 92.25 4.00 12.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 0.75 0.41 30.00 30.00 -1.52
124 SUR 24.33 23.60 7.22 9.33 3.56 8.00 0.00 1.97 30.00 47.69 -0.08
125 SWZ 85.51 14.50 10.20 9.60 4.00 7.56 46.92 53.46 -0.62
126 SWE 97.70 0.90 0.00 7.00 5.33 4.00 8.00 0.03 6.72 108.07 115.27 79.23 87.31 1.76
127 CHE 91.80 9.47 13.76 4.54 4.38 4.00 8.00 0.03 8.90 230.51 95.76 83.85 90.00 1.74
128 SYR 93.56 0.00 71.00 8.20 9.00 1.20 8.00 0.00 0.48 13.85 29.62 -0.90
129 TJK 100.00 19.23 7.75 7.67 7.40 4.00 7.69 0.18 0.52 29.23 29.23 -1.14
130 TZA 75.99 52.21 17.74 6.60 8.40 2.80 7.80 0.10 0.64 4.69 4.55 54.62 33.08 -0.41
131 THA 66.28 6.13 24.67 8.31 9.00 1.67 8.00 0.18 3.33 59.22 89.79 53.85 56.92 -0.10
132 TGO 17.50 51.00 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 1.14 26.92 30.00 -0.94
133 TTO 96.35 14.35 15.90 7.85 5.85 3.11 5.85 0.56 4.42 73.71 2.77 70.00 68.85 0.18
134 TUN 64.11 15.70 42.70 8.00 7.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.47 13.67 14.75 39.23 50.00 -0.07
135 TUR 81.10 6.32 33.21 7.67 5.56 4.00 7.11 0.48 1.00 29.75 153.72 51.54 54.62 -0.10
136 UGA 78.12 75.58 0.64 10.40 8.00 3.00 8.00 0.17 0.50 10.70 1.48 56.92 40.77 -0.63
137 UKR 95.05 17.96 12.98 5.00 8.00 4.00 8.00 2.32 20.51 7.43 40.00 30.00 -0.57
138 ARE 74.55 27.00 35.00 5.80 6.00 3.00 8.00 0.00 1.47 26.57 62.43 43.85 61.54 0.50
139 GBR 63.11 46.53 2.89 3.69 3.77 4.00 8.00 14.64 136.40 126.50 88.46 89.23 1.45
140 USA 38.01 10.73 0.00 8.38 7.78 4.00 7.69 0.01 7.34 81.54 89.23 1.29
141 URY 70.75 41.77 51.01 7.22 8.00 4.00 7.11 0.00 1.73 0.54 3.08 48.46 70.38 0.72
142 VUT 92.56 8.58 9.11 7.44 4.00 7.69 0.00 40.00 40.00 0.15
143 VEN 62.58 35.05 9.19 7.00 7.77 4.00 7.69 0.17 1.57 4.29 5.57 37.69 25.38 -1.08
144 VNM 74.90 12.00 8.00 8.00 1.25 12.29 58.03 30.00 10.77 -0.53
145 YEM 100.00 9.00 10.00 4.00 8.00 0.80 0.23 30.00 30.00 -1.10
146 ZMB 82.80 64.00 23.00 9.00 10.00 8.00 1.27 13.36 4.40 53.08 43.85 -0.43
Mean 82.64 38.38 17.24 7.58 7.03 3.71 7.58 0.20 2.81 53.51 48.96 53.50 50.33 0.08
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Table1: Summary s tatis tics . Defini tions  of variables  are in Appendix A3.
 Obs .  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Med.  Max.
Bank Competition
Lerner index 1581 0.251 0.135 -1.609 0.244 0.650
Boone indicator 1825 -0.045 0.297 -2.162 -0.055 5.968
Market Structure
Concentration % 1471 80.667 15.967 28.050 83.463 100.000
Log(No. of banks  to population) 1742 -13.072 1.443 -16.705 -13.193 -7.557
Foreign bank ownership % 1282 36.930 31.254 0.000 25.800 100.000
State  bank ownership % 1303 16.846 21.668 0.000 6.800 95.780
Market Contestabi l i ty
Activi ty restriction 1492 7.492 2.042 3.000 8.000 12.000
Financia l  conglomeratem 1425 6.796 1.758 3.000 7.000 12.000
Limit on foreign banks  1237 3.755 0.629 0.000 4.000 4.000
Entry requirment 1702 7.584 0.985 0.000 8.000 8.000
Fraction denied % 724 0.182 0.267 0.000 0.004 1.000
Inter-Industry 
Insurance penetration % 1662 2.880 2.869 0.005 1.747 18.188
Stock market capita l i zation % 1251 54.807 63.733 0.101 34.594 606.001
Stock market efficiency 1231 50.730 78.563 0.000 25.785 1612.942
Insti tution 
Financia l  freedom 1767 54.041 18.342 10.000 50.000 90.000
Property right 1767 50.733 22.692 0.000 50.000 95.000
KKZ index 1606 0.077 0.870 -1.747 -0.127 1.986
Control  Variables
Log (GDP per capita) 1705 10.668 2.245 5.599 10.376 16.894
Bank credit growth 1550 0.039 1.056 -17.388 0.023 31.662
GDP growth % 1703 4.333 4.296 -17.955 4.260 34.500
Inflation % 1652 7.052 15.926 -8.525 4.100 324.997
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Table 2     Competition model based on World Bank data: Baseline results 
Definitions of all variables are listed in Appendix A3. We estimate all regressions using the two-step GMM estimator of Arellano 
and Bond (1991). Robust T-values are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. Sargan test: the test for over-identifying restrictions in the GMM dynamic model estimation. AR(1) and AR(2): the 
autocorrelation tests in residuals of order 1 and 2, respectively. Sample size varies across regression specifications since not all 
variables are available for all countries and/or for the full sample period (1999-2011). 
Panel A: Market structure and competition: Regression results of model                                         
                                       .  
Model  1: Lerner index Model  2: Boone indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.315*** 0.354*** 0.130*** 0.049***
(8.95) (10.10) (70.02) (41.67)   
Market Structure
Concentration 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.002** 0.001**
(2.61) (2.89) (1.96) (2.42)
No. of banks  to population -0.015 -0.007 -0.067* -0.013
(-1.15) (-1.08) (-1.70) (-0.47)
Foreign bank ownership -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.006***
(-3.66) (-3.30) (-12.31) (-10.13)
State  bank ownership 0.003 0.001 0.012*** 0.002** 
(1.11) (0.69) (6.15) (2.00)   
Control  Variables
Log (GDP per capita) 0.023* 0.037***
(1.75) (4.31)   
Bank credit growth -0.003*** -0.000***
(-3.40) (-2.69)   
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001   
(-0.13) (-0.94)   
Inflation -0.002*** 0.002***
(-2.98) (8.22)   
Sargan test (p-va lue) 0.12 0.14 0.31 0.31
AR(1)-(p-va lue) 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
AR(2)-(p-va lue) 0.41 0.33 0.66 0.90
Number of country 146 146 146 146
Noumber of obs . 839 779 904 836
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Panel B: Market contestability and competition: Regression results of 
model                                                                                       .  
Model  1: Lerner index Model  2: Boone indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.089*** 0.073*** 0.081*** 0.091***
(12.23) (13.69) (10.40) (9.98)
Market Contestabi l i ty
Activi ty restriction 0.077*** 0.061*** 0.032*** 0.031***
(4.79) (3.95) (12.71) (13.45)
Financia l  conglomeratem 0.059*** 0.052*** 0.064* 0.055*
(3.55) (3.06) (1.83) (1.71)
Limit on foreign banks  0.031 0.029 0.006 0.070***
(1.63) (1.03) (0.31) (3.17)
Entry requirment 0.067*** 0.058** 0.031*** 0.012***
(3.49) (1.98) (3.33) (3.81)
Fraction denied 0.773* 0.609* 0.305 0.345
(1.76) (1.71) (1.21) (1.06)
Control  Variables
Log (GDP per capita) -0.019*** 0.177***
(-2.62) (10.47)   
Bank credit growth -0.004*** -0.001   
(-6.18) (-0.71)   
GDP growth 0.003*** -0.002***
(4.35) (-10.98)   
Inflation -0.003*** -0.002***
(-4.49) (-5.25)   
Sargan test (p-va lue) 0.61 0.82 0.43 0.92
AR(1)-(p-va lue) 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
AR(2)-(p-va lue) 0.13 0.09 0.32 0.32
Number of country 146 146 146 146
Noumber of obs . 371 356 413 373  
 
Panel C: Inter-industry and competition: Regression results of model                                       
                                       .  
Model  1: Lerner index Model  2: Boone indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.201*** 0.226*** 0.194*** 0.190***
(6.89) (8.02) (7.80) (7.76)
Inter-Industry 
Insurance penetration -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.019*** -0.018***
(-4.72) (-3.03) (-3.68) (-4.52)
Stock market capita l i zation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001*
(-1.50) (-1.23) (-1.76) (-1.74)
Stock market efficiency -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.76) (-1.38) (-0.05) (-0.31)
Control  Variables
Log (GDP per capita) 0.008 -0.023***
(0.66) (-4.47)   
Bank credit growth -0.004** 0.002   
(-2.38) (0.37)   
GDP growth 0.001 0.001
(1.37) (0.86)   
Inflation -0.002*** -0.002***
(-4.63) (-5.26)   
Sargan test (p-va lue) 0.21 0.25 0.15 0.12
AR(1)-(p-va lue) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02
AR(2)-(p-va lue) 0.94 0.98 0.33 0.35
Number of country 146 146 146 146
Noumber of obs . 1006 942 1041 976  
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Panel D: Institution and competition: Regression results of 
model                                                                           . 
Model  1: Lerner index Model  2: Boone indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.324*** 0.311*** 0.283*** 0.282***
(9.19) (9.21) (8.84) (8.19)
Insti tution 
Financia l  freedom 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.004
(0.36) (0.33) (-0.83) (-0.63)
Property right -0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.004***
(-0.51) (-0.78) (-9.31) (-7.12)   
KKZ index -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.416*** -0.489***
(3.78) (-4.19) (-20.45) (-24.58)
Control  Variables
Log (GDP per capi ta) -0.009 -0.110***
(-0.77) (-6.12)   
Bank credi t growth -0.002** -0.002***
(-2.09) (-4.51)   
GDP growth 0.001*** 0.001   
(2.79) (1.62)   
Inflation -0.002*** -0.001***
(-3.36) (-3.59)   
Sargan test (p-va lue) 0.26 0.07 0.09 0.12
AR(1)-(p-va lue) 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
AR(2)-(p-va lue) 0.74 0.83 0.24 0.27
Number of country 146 146 146 146
Noumber of obs . 1295 1180 1444 1269  
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Table 3     Competition model based on World Bank data: Main results 
Regression results of model                                                                     
                                                                          . Definitions of all variables are 
listed in Appendix A3. We estimate all regressions using the two-step GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond. Robust T-values 
are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Sargan test: the test for over-
identifying restrictions in the GMM dynamic model estimation. AR(1) and AR(2): autocorrelation tests in residuals of order 1 
and 2, respectively.  Note that we eliminate Number of bank to population as it is fixed over time and similarly Limit on foreign 
bank and also Fraction denied, Stock market capitalization, and Stock market efficiency as we have limited observations and also 
they perform poorly in baselines results. Sample size varies across regression specifications, since not all variables are available 
for all countries or for the full sample period (1999-2011). 
Panel A: The Lerner index 
Advanced vs . emerging vs . developing countries
Al l Advanced Emerging Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.419*** 0.455** 0.353* 0.564***
(5.90) (2.05) (1.78) (5.23)   
Market Structure
Concentration 0.010* -0.002*** 0.005 0.013** 
(1.76) (-3.32) (0.30) (2.07)   
Foreign bank ownership -0.001** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002*
(-2.11) (-0.60) (-3.45) (-1.74)   
State  bank ownership 0.001** -0.001 0.001* 0.002*** 
(2.38) (-1.46) (1.73) (4.43)   
Market Contestabi l i ty
Activi ty restriction 0.006** 0.008 0.007** 0.012***
2.20) (0.70) (2.16) (4.30)   
Financia l  conglomeratem 0.002* -0.007 0.021* 0.016***
(1.78) (-1.39) (1.76) (4.46)   
Entry requirment 0.004** 0.006 0.021** 0.008***
(1.97) (1.09) (2.24) (3.43)   
Inter-Industry 
Insurance penetration -0.003* -0.015*** -0.006 0.012   
(-1.86) (-4.81) (-0.42) (1.15)   
Insti tution 
Financia l  freedom 0.002 -0.003** 0.002* 0.000   
(1.06) (-2.15) (1.72) (0.43)   
Property right -0.002*** 0.002 -0.003* -0.000** 
(-3.79) (1.12) (-1.68) (-2.07)   
KKZ index -0.001** 0.008   -0.144* -0.187***
(-2.07) (0.33)   (-1.69) (-5.32)
Control  Variables
Log (GDP per capita) 0.059*** 0.047 0.143 -0.000   
(3.27) (1.21) (1.53) (-0.02)   
Bank credit growth -0.002** -0.084* 0.050 -0.004***
(-2.12) (-1.79) (1.48) (-3.63)   
GDP growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   
(1.62) (0.88) (0.70) (0.82)   
Inflation -0.003*** -0.013*** -0.003** -0.002***
(-3.88) (-9.12) (-2.04) (-2.96)   
Sargan test (p-va lue) 0.20 0.98 0.99 0.99
AR(1)-(p-va lue) 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02
AR(2)-(p-va lue) 0.12 0.75 0.32 0.45
Number of country 146 33 40 73
Noumber of obs . 521 173 194 154   
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Panel B: Boone Indicator 
Advanced vs . emerging vs . developing countries
Al l Advanced Emerging Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.123*** 0.077*** 0.334*** 0.511***
(24.76) (14.96) (7.11) (31.96)   
Market Structure
Concentration 0.002*** -0.001* -0.000 0.002***
(3.90) (-1.70) (-0.13) (3.91)   
Foreign bank ownership -0.002*** -0.000 -0.004*** -0.000   
(-17.75) (-0.94) (-10.50) (-0.57)   
State  bank ownership 0.001* -0.004** -0.001 0.001** 
(1.80) (-2.04) (-0.94) (2.04)   
Market Contestabi l i ty
Activi ty restriction 0.002* 0.003 0.001 0.005***
(1.75) (0.69) (0.88) (3.18)   
Financia l  conglomeratem 0.009*** 0.00 0.003** -0.002   
(3.37) (0.60) (2.29) (-0.60)   
Entry requirment 0.004 0.001   0.008* 0.023**
(1.53) (0.41)   (1.78) (2.07)
Inter-Industry 
Insurance penetration 0.017*** 0.010** -0.004*** 0.004   
(3.77) (2.51) (-3.31) (0.59)   
Insti tution 
Financia l  freedom -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 0.001***
(-0.46) (-4.47) (1.32) (3.82)   
Property right -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001***
(-2.92) (-0.72) (-3.31) (-4.24)   
KKZ index -0.043*** 0.042 -0.024* -0.036**
(-4.49) (1.19) (-1.79) (-1.98)   
Control  Variables
Log (GDP per capita) 0.010* -0.143*** 0.005 0.042***
(1.86) (-2.62) (0.79) (7.17)   
Bank credit growth 0.001 0.047 -0.002 -0.001   
(0.84) (1.29) (-0.14) (-0.99)   
GDP growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** -0.000   
(-1.00) (-0.50) (-9.53) (-1.50)   
Inflation -0.001** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.000   
(-2.28) (-0.22) (-2.99) (-0.13)   
Sargan test (p-va lue) 0.07 0.96 0.99 0.97
AR(1)-(p-va lue) 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.19
AR(2)-(p-va lue) 0.60 0.21 0.40 0.29
Number of country 146 33 40 73
Noumber of obs . 551 177 204 170  
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Table 4     Competition model based on Clerides et al. (2013) data: Robustness test  
Regression results of model                                                                     
                                                                          . Definitions of all variables are 
listed in Appendix A3. We estimate all regressions using the two-step GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). Robust T-
values are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Sargan test: the test for 
over-identifying restrictions in the GMM dynamic model estimation. AR(1) and AR(2): autocorrelation tests in residuals of order 
1 and 2, respectively. Sample size varies across regression specifications as not all variables are available for all countries or for 
the full sample period (1999-2010). 
Panel A: Adjusted Lerner index 
Advanced vs . emerging vs . developing countries
Al l Advanced Emerging Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.537*** 0.319*** 0.378*** 0.463** 
(9.09) (2.97) (3.16) (2.46)   
Market Structure
Concentration 0.001* -0.001 0.002 0.003***
(1.67) (-1.07) (0.98) (2.68)   
Foreign bank ownership -0.001 0.001 -0.001** -0.001  
(-0.33) (1.31) (-2.16) (-1.14)   
State  bank ownership 0.001*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002* 
(3.79) (1.01) (2.80) (1.72)   
Market Contestabi l i ty
Activi ty restriction 0.003* -0.000   0.003* 0.010**
(1.89) (-0.11)   (1.71) (2.45)
Financia l  conglomeratem 0.005** -0.003   0.001 0.011**
(2.14) (-0.89)   (0.42) (2.30)
Entry requirment 0.005*** -0.027 0.018*** 0.008** 
(3.03) (-1.31) (4.48) (1.98)   
Inter-Industry 
Insurance penetration -0.010** -0.001** -0.001 0.030   
(-2.38) (-1.94) (-0.13) (1.62)   
Insti tution 
Financia l  freedom -0.001 -0.002*  0.001* -0.000
(0.90) (-1.87)   (1.72) (-0.40)
Property right -0.002** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002** 
(-2.06) (-0.34) (-2.77) (-2.32)   
KKZ index -0.047* -0.008 -0.072** -0.130*  
(-1.77) (-0.16) (-2.04) (-1.86)   
Control  Variables
Log (GDP per capita) -0.006 0.017 -0.012 -0.032** 
(-0.83) (0.92) (-0.77) (-2.00)   
Bank credit growth -0.001 -0.040 0.022 -0.000   
(-1.56) (-1.33) (0.64) (-0.27)   
GDP growth 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(6.52) (4.40) (5.60) (3.31)   
Inflation -0.004*** -0.014*** -0.003** -0.002*  
(-5.56) (-6.80) (-2.32) (-1.73)   
Sargan test (p-va lue) 0.08 0.75 0.98 0.82
AR(1)-(p-va lue) 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.07
AR(2)-(p-va lue) 0.64 0.22 0.89 0.79
Number of country 128 32 40 56
Noumber of obs . 492 163 179 150  
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Panel B: Boone indicator  
Advanced vs . emerging vs . developing countries
Al l Advanced Emerging Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.920*** 0.720*** 0.209** 0.652***
(17.76) (5.81) (2.20) (13.17)   
Market Structure
Concentration 0.001** -0.001* 0.001 0.002**
(2.28) (-1.79) (0.30) (2.16)   
Foreign bank ownership -0.001* 0.001 -0.001* -0.001   
(-1.77) (0.64) (-1.80) (-0.40)   
State  bank ownership 0.001** -0.001*** 0.000 0.003***
(2.13) (-3.04)   (0.31) (2.62)
Market Contestabi l i ty
Activi ty restriction 0.008*** 0.005 0.004** 0.002**
(3.01) (0.92) (2.05) (2.10)   
Financia l  conglomeratem 0.003* -0.000 0.008* 0.004**
(1.78) (-0.03) (1.84) (2.21)   
Entry requirment 0.003*** 0.008 0.019 0.001** 
(2.94) (0.77) (-1.05) (2.18)   
Inter-Industry 
Insurance penetration -0.002* -0.012* 0.001 0.009   
(-1.83) (-1.78) (0.28) (1.53)   
Insti tution 
Financia l  freedom -0.000 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.000   
(-0.62) (-3.23) (1.28) (-0.24)   
Property right -0.001 0.001 -0.002** -0.001*  
(-1.34) (1.03) (-2.12) (-1.92)   
KKZ index -0.044*** -0.018 -0.069* -0.045***
(-3.33) (-0.24) (-1.96) (-2.61)   
Control  Variables
Log (GDP per capita) -0.004 -0.023 0.037 0.006   
(-0.64) (-1.09) (1.53) (0.83)   
Bank credit growth 0.000** -0.111** 0.002 0.001*  
(2.54) (-2.17) (0.11) (1.65)   
GDP growth 0.000 -0.001 0.001** 0.001***
(0.05) (-0.80) (2.48) (3.13)   
Inflation -0.003*** -0.017*** -0.004*** -0.001** 
(-4.22) (-7.21) (-4.40) (-2.00)   
Sargan test (p-va lue) 0.17 0.88 0.90 0.99
AR(1)-(p-va lue) 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.04
AR(2)-(p-va lue) 0.70 0.55 0.16 0.88
Number of country 128 32 40 56
Noumber of obs . 492 163 179 150 
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Table 5     Competition model based on bank-level data for the Lerner index: Robustness test  
Regression results of model                                                                                    
                                                                              . Definitions of all variables are 
listed in Appendix A2. We estimate all regressions using the two-step GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). Robust T-
values are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Sargan test: the test for 
over-identifying restrictions in the GMM dynamic model estimation. AR(1) and AR(2): autocorrelation tests in residuals of order 
1 and 2, respectively, are 0  (H0: no autocorrelation).  Sample period (1999-2011). 
Advanced vs . emerging vs . developing countries
Al l Advanced Emerging Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.721*** 0.339*** 0.567*** 0.466***
(26.89) (10.68) (18.19) (7.26)   
Bank Control
Log (s ize) -0.025*** -0.035*** -0.021*** -0.011*
(-6.10) (-3.18) (-5.39) (-1.77)   
Capita l  adequacy 0.010 -0.237 -0.018 0.307***
(0.32) (-1.61) (-0.66) (5.04)   
Share of wholesa le funding 0.015* 0.052*** -0.012* -0.029
(1.75) (3.90) (-1.75) (-1.26)   
Lending -0.052*** 0.004 -0.003 -0.031   
(-2.80) (0.11) (-0.17) (-0.74)   
Divers i fication -0.170*** -0.135*** 1.211*** 1.147***
(-11.78) (-10.44) (5.43) (4.18)   
Market Structure
Concentration 0.005*** -0.001   0.002*** 0.008***
(12.55) (-0.78)   (4.22) (13.61)
Foreign bank ownership 0.001 -0.001   -0.004*** -0.006***
(0.02) (-0.47)   (-5.48) (-6.07)
State  bank ownership 0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 0.002***
(2.80) (1.05) (-1.41) (3.39)   
Market Contestabi l i ty
Activi ty restriction 0.002* -0.008   0.002 0.016***
(1.85) (-0.84)   (1.34) (4.94)
Financia l  conglomeratem 0.006* 0.012   0.043*** 0.014***
(1.67) (0.84)   (9.79) (3.65)
Entry requirment 0.033*** 0.068*** 0.050*** 0.010** 
(4.66) (7.28) (3.26) (2.32)   
Inter-Industry 
Insurance penetration -0.003 -0.007* 0.002 0.006   
(-1.63) (-1.69) (1.03) (1.40)   
Insti tution 
Financia l  freedom -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 0.001***
(-4.91) (-4.38) (-1.42) (2.84)   
Property right -0.004*** 0.001 -0.005*** -0.001*  
(-9.74) (1.54) (-8.78) (-1.70)   
KKZ index -0.121*** 0.139*** -0.113*** -0.096*   
(-8.37) (5.04) (-3.82) (-1.76)   
Control  Variables
Log (GDP per capita) 0.039** 0.065 -0.035** -0.016   
(2.33) (1.40) (-2.22) (-1.06)   
Bank credit growth 0.022** 0.334*** 0.004 0.006** 
(2.56) (10.82) (0.26) (2.31)   
GDP growth 0.001*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001*  
(3.50) (-10.52) (-3.29) (-1.75)   
Inflation 0.004*** 0.032*** -0.004*** 0.005***
(7.49) (20.38) (-5.87) (5.70)   
Sargan test (p-va lue) 0.15 0.25 0.09 0.07
AR(1)-(p-va lue) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
AR(2)-(p-va lue) 0.36 0.67 0.22 0.38
Number of country 134 33 40 61
Noumber of obs . 15273 9111 5113 1049    
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Figure 1a: Evolution of bank competition (World Bank data).  
 
This figure shows the evolution of the averaged Lerner index and Boone indicator across  146 countries. 
Figure 1b: Evolution of bank competition (Clerides et al. data)  
 
This figure shows the evolution of the averaged Lerner index and Boone indicator across 128 countries.   
  
.21
.22
.23
.24
.25
.26
.27
.28
.29
.30
-.08
-.07
-.06
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
Boone indicator (RHS)
Lerner index (LHS)
Bank Competition in 146 Countries over 1999-2011. Source: World Bank-GFI
.16
.18
.20
.22
.24
.26
.28
-.52
-.50
-.48
-.46
-.44
-.42
-.40
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
Boone indicator
Adj. Lerner index
Bank Competition in 128 Countries over 1999-2010. Source: Clerides et al. (2013)
 
 
46 
 
Figure 2     Evolution of bank competition in different income-group countries (World Bank data).  
 
This figure shows the evolution of the averaged Lerner index across 146 countries in different income 
groups.  
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